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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the operational resilience of electric power 
and water distribution systems on the island of St. Croix (STX) of the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. This thesis achieves this goal by: (1) simulating hurricane scenarios for the STX 
electric power and water distribution systems, (2) measuring the impacts of hurricanes 
and benefits of hurricane hardening using operator models for both systems, and (3) using 
results to recommend hurricane mitigation via system hardening and redesign. 
Results show that the STX electric power distribution system is vulnerable to hurricane 
winds, as Category-3 storms will lead to island-wide blackouts. Analysis of 
power system hardening methods shows that neither composite poles nor 
underground power lines on their own protect systems from Category-3 storms, but a 
combination of both brings the greatest potential benefit. Results for the STX water 
distribution system show which pump stations are critical for water delivery and 
which communities will lose water during hurricane-induced blackouts. To improve 
power and water access during future hurricanes, we recommend a combination of 
system hardening and redesign that considers the vulnerabilities and operations of 
both interdependent systems. 
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Executive Summary
The U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) is an island territory in the Caribbean Sea comprised of
three main islands: St. Thomas (STT), St. John (STJ), and St. Croix (STX). In September
2017, the USVI was impacted by two Category-5 hurricanes, Irma and Maria. Hurricane
Irma made an indirect hit on STT and STJ on September 6 and 7, and Hurricane Maria
made an indirect hit on STX just 13 days later on September 20. Together, these disasters
caused the entire territory to experience major losses of critical infrastructure systems
that support the health and economic welfare of local communities. In response, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) brought local stakeholders and federal
agencies together to support hurricane recovery and to determineways to adaptUSVI critical
infrastructure systems to future disasters. This thesis is part of this larger FEMA-funded
effort focused on improving the resilience of USVI electric power, water, transportation,
and telecommunications systems. It focuses on measuring the vulnerability and benefits of
hardening interdependent electric power andwater infrastructure systems to future disasters.
The analyses presented here focus on systems owned and operated by the Virgin Islands
Water and Power Authority (VIWAPA) on STX.
Specifically, we study how the STX electric power distribution system (EPDS) and water
distribution system (WDS) function during infrastructure failures caused by hurricanes.
The primary research questions answered with this thesis are.
• Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the vulnerability of the STX EPDS to hurri-
canes?
• Research Question 2 (RQ2): What is the vulnerability of the STX WDS to pump
station failures?
• Research Question 3 (RQ3): What is the interdependent vulnerability of the STX
EPDS and WDS?
We create detailedmodels of the STXEPDS andWDS operation and expose thesemodels to
hurricane impact scenarios via simulation-optimization methods to answer these questions.
We use this models to measure the ability of the STX EPDS and WDS to function via loss
of electric power load and water served during hurricanes, respectively. We translate these
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results into recommendations to harden both systems so they can better serve communities
during and after hurricanes. The simulation-optimization methods used in this thesis follow
a three step process.
First, we simulate hurricane scenarios for the STX EPDS and WDS that are representative
of future disasters. For the EPDS, we generate 20 hurricane scenarios to study what parts
of the system are operating after a hurricane. Specifically, we use Monte Carlo Simulation
to create infrastructure fragility curves and simulate which parts of the EPDS fail during
different categories of hurricane wind speeds. We use the same methods to test how
different power system hardening methods may survive similar hurricane scenarios. For
the STXWDS, we focus on indirect impacts by studying different EPDS blackout scenarios
hurricanes can cause. We enumerate all combinations of pumping station failures on STX
due to blackouts and simulate best-case operations to distribute water for each.
Second, we measure the impacts of hurricanes and potential benefits of hurricane hardening
using operator models for the STX EPDS and WDS. For STX EPDS, we create an Alter-
nating Current Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) model that determines system dispatch to
minimize loss of load using the Python programming-based optimization package Pyomo.
Model output includes the total number of customers without power and loss of electric
power demand caused by the disaster. For the STX WDS, we create a pressure driven
demand (PDD) simulation model that balances hydraulic losses, flows, and pressures using
the Python programming-based package Water Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR). The
model produces as output the pump operations and tank levels that serve water demands
during different operational scenarios. When exposed to hurricane scenarios generated by
the methods just described, both the STX EPDS andWDS operator models provide realistic
estimates of howwell each system functions. This is important because the differing physics
and electricity and water alongside the differing structure and function of the STX EPDS
and WDS mean both systems react differently to hurricane damages.
Third, we use results from the second step to test and recommend hurricane mitigation via
system hardening and redesign. For the STX EPDS, we measure the potential benefits of
using composite power poles and installing undergrounding infrastructure to protect power
lines from hurricane winds. We compare vulnerable and hardened systems with failure
probabilities that relate to composite and underground infrastructure. For the STX WDS,
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we determine which pumping stations are more critical to operate and recommend changes
to the STX EPDS to ensure electricity is available to critical water infrastructure. We
complete this assessment by determining how frequently different pumping stations will be
affected by blackouts.
Results for RQ1 show that the STX EPDS is vulnerable to hurricanes with relatively low
wind speeds. On average, all customers served by the STX EPDS lose electricity when
a Category-3 hurricane makes landfall on the island. Simulations for Category-1 and 2
hurricanes also show that the EPDS experiences major damage, with an average of 0.6%
and 60% customers losing electricity, respectively.
RQ1 results show that the EPDS feeder power lines all have a different level of vulnerability.
The STX EPDS comprises of ten feeder lines that serve customers, and each feeder is
designed in a different way and serves different customers. The vulnerability depends on
the distance between substation and customers and the location of the feeder on the island.
Across all scenarios, the most robust feeder is Feeder 01a near the STX power generation
plant and Richmond substation. The most vulnerable feeders are Feeders 02a and 10b that
serve the middle, the northwest, and east parts of the island.
RQ1 results also show that a combination of composite poles and underground infrastructure
is the best option for hardening the STX EPDS to future hurricanes. Each hardening method
can survive high winds, yet each is still vulnerable to hurricanes. Specifically, composite
poles in forested areas have a high likelihood of tree strikes and underground feeders in
urban or suburban areas are vulnerable to rain, flooding, and ocean storm surge. Due
to these vulnerabilities, the STX EPDS will still experience significant load shed during
Category-3 hurricanes when using either composite poles or underground infrastructure.
In contrast, a combined approach that uses both methods was most effective, having nearly
no loss of load for the same category hurricane.
Results for RQ2 show that the speed at which customers lose water due to blackouts
depends on which pumping stations lose power. The STX WDS has three main pumping
stations – Richmond, Contentment, and Concordia. Results show that the system will drain
completely after a three days (i.e., all customers will lose access to water) if there is an
outage at Richmond whether or not other pumping stations are operational. Nevertheless,
the system will drain faster if multiple pumping stations are down alongside Richmond.
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Results also show that all customers downstream from the Contentment pumping station
will lose access water after 5 to 6 days if Contentment has a prolonged blackout. This
loss of water occurs more slowly than if a blackout affects Richmond. In contrast, loss of
Concordia pumping station does not lead to system draining when water tank levels are high
across the island prior to blackout.
Results for RQ3 show that Concordia pumping station is the most vulnerable to blackouts.
Richmond pumping station is only vulnerable to blackouts that affect power generation
(not EPDS operation), because it is directly connected to the Richmond substation via
underground lines. In contrast, Contentment and Concordia access electricity via above-
ground lines and are in the middle of the island. Combined electric power and water
analysis show the Concordia pumping station has over 90% probability of blackout if the
feeder power line serving it fails. On the other hand, Contentment pumping station has only
a 70% probability of blackout for the same scenarios.
Despite the vulnerability of Concordia pump station to blackouts, hardening recommen-
dations to protect the interdependent operation of the STX EPDS and WDS should focus
on Contentment pump station. Hardening can be completed in one of several ways. The
first — which may also be the easiest and fastest to complete — is to connect Contentment
pumping station to Feeder 01a in addition to its current feeder (i.e., Feeder 02a). This
decreases the probability of failure because Feeder 01 is the most robust across the island.
Other hardening options include installing composite poles for the portion of Feeder 02a
serving Contentment.
Overall, results demonstrate the importance of using analysis to support operation and
planning of STXwater and electric power systems, particularlywhen it comes to investments
intended to make the system more resilient. Without this analysis, it is unclear how
vulnerable the individual EPDS and WDS will react to different hurricanes. Moreover,
results show that recommendations to protect systems require one to consider hardening
and mitigation activities alongside system function. Recommendations presented herein
would benefit from future analyses in the USVI. For example, future work for STX could
focus on improving emergency plans for pre-storm preparation and post-storm recovery
activities. Furthermore, physical hardening of the STX systems should be considered
alongside the STT and STJ systems to make territorial solutions as effective as possible.
xx
This thesis also addresses two important gaps in the scientific literature. Creating hurricane
scenarios with the help of fragility analysis and parsing this scenarios to the USVI EPDS
operator model have never been implemented before. And second, there is no study in
scientific literature which focuses on the survivability of WDS given multiple blackouts in
the EPDS caused by a devastating hurricane scenario. The combination of these three steps
of simulation is an important technical contribution and a novel in the literature.
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In 2017, several hurricanes and tropical storms devastated U.S. communities across the
Caribbean, Gulf, andEastern seaboard. Two of these storms—Hurricanes Irma andMaria—
both became Category-5 hurricanes with sustained winds above 157mph (Schott et al. 2012)
and went over the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) Territory within a two-week period.
The resulting extremewinds, flooding, and storm surge caused by these hurricanes impacted
USVI communities and the critical infrastructure systems they depend on for daily life. The
loss of electric power, water, transportation, and telecommunications services exacerbated
the initial impacts from the storms for several months as communities tried to rebuild (USVI
Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018).
In response to these events, the USVI Territorial Government, U.S. Federal Agencies, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), university researchers, and community organizations
among others began to work with impacted communities to help them recover from the
storms and determine ways to improve USVI critical infrastructure systems to be resilient
to future catastrophic events. This thesis is part of a number of efforts to assess USVI
infrastructure systems and prepare them for the next disaster. In particular, this work is part
of a funded effort by the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) to bring FEMA,
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Department of Energy (DOE), DOE National Labs,
the University of Virgin Islands (UVI), and USVI infrastructure providers together to assess
and improve electricity, water, transportation, and telecommunications systems.
This thesis focuses on analyzing the interdependent operations of USVI electric power and
water distribution systems owned and operated by the Virgin Islands Water and Power Au-
thority (VIWAPA). The results from this thesis are intended to support USVI infrastructure
providers, community stakeholders, and FEMA operations. Additionally, results from this
thesis will support efforts to update the USVI Territorial Hazard Mitigation and Resilience
Plan (HMRP) led by experts at UVI.
1
1.1 The USVI and Critical Infrastructure Systems
1.1.1 Overview of the Territory
The USVI is an island territory in the Caribbean Sea composed of three main islands: Saint
Thomas (STT), Saint John (STJ), and Saint Croix (STX) (Figure 1.1). The Territory is
approximately 1,100 miles southeast of Florida and 40 miles east of Puerto Rico. STT and
STJ comprise the northern part of the territory (STT is east of STJ) and are only three miles
away from each other. STX is roughly 40 miles south of STT (USVI Hurricane Recovery
and Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018).
STT, STJ, and STX each have a unique culture, geography, and communities that distinguish
one from the other. The capital of STT, Charlotte Amalie, is the center of USVI government,
public life, and tourism. STT has a varied topography and many secluded communities
separated by hills. Roughly half of the territorial population (51,634 people in 2010) lives
on STT (United States Census Bureau 2011).
In contrast, STJ is the smallest island both in size and population. STJ only had 4,170
residents in 2010 (United States Census Bureau 2011) and the vast majority of the land
consists of protected national park. Due to the close proximity of STT and STJ, communities
on STJ receive essentially all supplies from STT. These supplies include critical services.
For example, electric power and drinking water for both STT and STJ are produced on STTs.
To reach STJ communities, power and water is pumped and distributed through underwater
power lines and pipes, respectively, from STT to STJ (USVI Hurricane Recovery and
Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018).
STX is separated from the other two islands by 40miles and has a distinct culture, geography,
and communities. The population is with 50,601 people similar to that of STT (United
States Census Bureau 2011). STX, however, has a much flatter topography than STT and
STJ, is the center for USVI industry, has significant rural areas, and two primary cities:
Frederiksted and Christiansted (Figure 1.1). The center of public life and government on
STX is Christiansted in the north central portion of the island. Christiansted includes some
industry and service providers, such as power and water generation for the island, and
most of the major shopping malls. On the southern side of the island, there is significant
industrial development, including major rum distilleries (e.g., Cruzan, Captain Morgan),
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the airport, and the Limetree Bay Refinery (currently non-operational). Frederiksted is a
major population center on the west coast of the island and serves cruise ships that dock.
Otherwise, most of the area on STX is suburban or rural, especially the eastern and north-
west parts of the island that have low populations and limited access to services (USVI
Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018).
Source: United States Census Bureau (2016)
.
Figure 1.1. United States Virgin Islands [not to scale].
Critical infrastructure for electric power, water, transportation, and telecommunications
systems are owned and operated by several key organizations across the territory.
• Electric power and water distribution systems are owned and operated by VIWAPA
(Alderson et al. 2018).
• Transportation systems, including roadways, ports, and critical supply chain in-
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frastructure, are owned and operated by Virgin Islands Department of Public
Works (VIDPW), Virgin Islands Port Authority (VIPA), the West Indian Company
Ltd (WICO), and three primary shipping companies Crowley Shipping, Tropical
Shipping, and Priority RoRo (Good 2019).
• Telecommunications systems for internet, cellphone reception, TV, and radio are
owned and operated by the Virgin Islands Bureau of Information Technology (BIT),
the Virgin Islands Next Generation Network (viNGN), VI public access and ra-
dio (WTJX), the Virgin Islands Telephone Company (Viya), AT&T, PR Wireless
(formerly Sprint), Verizon, and T-Mobile (Alderson et al. 2018; USVI Hurricane
Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018).
The analysis in this thesis focuses on the electric power and water systems. Here, we provide
a brief overview of the structure and function of the electric power and water distribution
systems owned and operated by VIWAPA. For more detailed overviews of these and other
critical infrastructure systems across the USVI Territory, we refer readers to Alderson et al.
(2018) and USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force (2018).
1.1.2 Electric Power Distribution Systems in the USVI
STT and STJ share an Electric Power Distribution System (EPDS), and STX has its own,
separate EPDS. The majority of electric power for the STT/STJ system is generated at
the Randolph Harley Power Plant located in the capital, Charlotte Amalie. The Randolph
Harley plant has the capability to produce 141 Mega Watt (MW) with six operational fossil
fuel generators. VIWAPA has started to convert the generators from fuel oil to Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG). Additionally, two solar fields on STT support this power plant. One
is owned by a private investor and has the capability to generate 9 MW of Power and the
other one is owned by the VIPA and generates 0.5 MW. Another 10 MW is produced by
small, privately owned solar panels on roof tops of private houses. This is part of the
VIWAPA Net Metering Program which allows customers to produce their own electric
power.
After electric power is generated on STT/STJ, it is sent over power lines to five substations
on STT and one on STJ, and then onto end use (Figure 1.2) (USVI Hurricane Recovery
and Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018). The majority of power lines in the
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STT/STJ EPDS are above ground on wooden power poles. Some of these wooden poles,
especially those on STJ and STT, have been replaced with composite poles intended to
withstand wind speeds up to 200 mph (Koushikram 2019). Only 18 miles of power lines are
buried underground. The substation on STJ is connected to STT through submarine cables
(USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). Furthermore the system of
STT also serves smaller islands in the area through submarine cables.
Source: USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force (2018)
Figure 1.2. St. Thomas and St. John electric power distribution system
owned and operated by VIWAPA.
STX has its own independent EPDS. Similar to the STT/STJ system, there is one central
power plant, the Richmond power plant, located in Christiansted. The Richmond power
plant has six fossil fuel generators that produce 101MWof electric power. These generators
are already converted to LPG generators to lower operational costs. Another 5 MW on STX
are generated on the Toshiba solar field, which is owned by a private investor. An additional
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4.7 MW are also generated from VIWAPA’s Solar Net Metering program.
The STX EPDS has two substations that serve ten feeder lines. One of the substations is
adjacent to the Richmond power plant, and the other is located close to the harbor in the
southern portion of the island. Like on STT and STJ the majority of the EPDS is installed
above ground on overhead power poles. Only 57 miles are underground lines which is
basically the connection to Midland substation and the connection line to Frederiksted
(Figure 1.3) (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al.
2018).
Source: USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force (2018)
Figure 1.3. St. Croix electric power distribution system owned and operated
by VIWAPA.
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1.1.3 Water Distribution Systems in the USVI
Similar to their electric power arrangement, STT and STJ share aWater Distribution System
(WDS). Water is produced in a reverse osmosis (RO) facility owned by Seven Seas Water
next to the Randolph Harley Power Plant. It has the capacity to produce three Million
Gallons per Day (MGD) of fresh water out of sea water. From this facility the water is
sent to a large storage tank. From this storage tank the water is pumped through pipes to
other smaller tanks across the islands or directly to the customer (Figure 1.4). The system
on STT contains 7 storage tanks with an overall capacity of 35 Million Gallon (MG). The
pipe system is old, and the pipes have a lot of leaks that result in approximately 10% of the
water being lost in the STT system. STJ is connected to the STT WDS via an underwater
pipe (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018).
Source: USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force (2018)
Figure 1.4. St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix water distribution systems
owned and operated by VIWAPA.
7
Also similar to electric power, STX has its own independent water distribution system.
Water is produced in a Seven Seas Water facility in two RO facilities with a capacity of
1.5 MGD and 2.2 MGD, respectively, located next to the Richmond power plant. The
Richmond storage tank is also located right next to the RO facility. From this storage
tank water is pumped via the Richmond pumping station through two main pipes to two
additional pumping stations, Concordia and Contentment. These three pumping stations
feed six other tanks across the island or directly to customers (Figure 1.4). Important for
STX operations is that all water distribution west of Kingshill Tank in the center of the island
is gravity-driven without additional tanks or supporting pumping stations (USVI Hurricane
Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018).
1.2 Hurricanes Irma and Maria and the USVI
In 2017 two major hurricanes came through the Caribbean Sea and greatly impacted the
USVI. On September 6 and 7 Hurricane Irma hit STT and STJ, and on September 20
Hurricane Maria hit STX (Figure 1.5). Together, all three islands of the USVI received
major damage to critical infrastructure (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task
Force 2018; Alderson et al. 2018; Pasch et al. 2019; Cangialosi et al. 2018).
1.2.1 Hurricane Impacts onUSVIElectric PowerDistribution Systems
Hurricanes Irma and Maria led to significant losses of electricity for USVI communities.
Figure 1.6 shows the electric power restoration times for eligible customers after the two
storms. Initially, all customers on STT/STJ systems lost electricity, and more than 90% of
the customers on STX lost electricity. Recovery of the STT/STJ and STX EPDS took more
than three months for all systems (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force
2018; Alderson et al. 2018).
The loss of electric power was due to component failures within each power system. Some
power losses were due to failures at VIWAPA power plants. While Richmond power plant
on STX only received minor damage, coastal flooding damaged four out of six generators
at Randolph Harley power plant on STT. Some of the solar facilities across all islands also
got damaged or destroyed.
Themost significant reason for loss of electricity was failure of transmission and distribution
8
power line and transformer infrastructure. About 90% of the above ground power lines and
power poles were damaged or ripped out of the ground. The underground part of the system
was not damaged and survived the storms.
Hurricanes Irma and Maria on their way through the Caribbean. Adapted from
Pasch et al. (2019); Cangialosi et al. (2018) using QGIS (QGIS Development Team
2019).
Figure 1.5. Trajectories for Hurricanes Irma and Maria in relation to the
location of the USVI
As a result, after the storm more than 20,000 utility poles, 1,100 miles of power lines and
5,300 transformers needed to be replaced across all three islands (USVI Hurricane Recovery
and Resilience Task Force 2018). As a first response to these challenges VIWAPA worked
together with several agencies and brought inmore than 800 linemen from theU.S. mainland
to speed up the rebuilding of the power grid. Critical public facilities like hospitals or airports
were provided with electric power with the help of backup generators. The Virgin Islands
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Territorial Emergency Management Agency (VITEMA) and the United States Army Corps
of Engineers (USACE) helped with mobile generation assets (USVI Hurricane Recovery
andResilience Task Force 2018). Together, nearly 90%ofVIWAPAEPDS customers across
all islands had access to electric power on January 1, 2018 (Figure 1.6) (USVI Hurricane
Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018).
Electric Power restoration times by percent of eligible VIWAPA customers for St.
Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix. Note: the total number of eligible customers
for restoration changed throughout this period as customers addressed damage to
their homes that had previously rendered their residence ineligible for restoration.
Source: USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force (2018).
Figure 1.6. Restoration Times for Electric Power Systems on the USVI.
1.2.2 Hurricane Impacts on USVI Water Distribution Systems
For USVI WDS, the direct impacts to infrastructure caused by Irma and Maria were not
as bad as with power systems. There was some damage to water production facilities and
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pumping stations, but most infrastructure across all islands did not fail. The most direct
impacts were an increase in leaks throughout the system because of the huge amount of rain
water and sea level rise during the storm (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task
Force 2018). But these leaks were not responsible for collapsing the system.
The most significant impact to the water system came from the lack of electric power caused
by the loss of the VIWAPA EPDS. Although pump stations and tanks largely survived the
storms, the pumps could not run due to a lack of electricity. Without mobile backup power
generation provided by FEMA, VITEMA, VIWAPA, and others, the water system would
not have operated after the storms.
Another related impact to loss of pumping was an increase in water demand during disaster
recovery. VIWAPA customers needed water to clean their houses and nearby areas. In
addition, most of the houses on the island that have cisterns for water storage could not use
their own cisterns for potable water. This was also due to the power outage — to access
cistern water, many houses use electrical pumps that require the VIWAPA EPDS to operate
(Alderson et al. 2018).
1.3 Thesis Goals
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the operational resilience of electric power and
water distribution systems on the island of STX. Hurricanes Irma and Maria revealed that
USVI EPDS across all islands are vulnerable to extreme winds and flooding and difficulty
recovering in an efficientmanner. WhileUSVIWDS are less vulnerable to the direct impacts
of hurricanes, USVI WDS cannot function without access to electricity. Blackouts caused
by hurricanes and related natural disasters can greatly reduce the capacity of VIWAPA to
distribute water. Still, there are no quantitative models that measure just how vulnerable
these systems currently are or will be to future storms. Adapting current systems to become
more resilient to future disasters requires modeling and analysis that quantifies EPDS and
WDS vulnerabilities.
This thesis focuses on STX as an initial case study. Specifically, we aim to measure the
impacts of various hurricanes on the STX EPDS operation and the associated electricity
losses on the STX WDS operation. We also aim to measure the potential benefits of
hurricane hardening methods for both systems. The overall goal of this thesis is to develop
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quantitative methods that answer the following research questions.
• Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the vulnerability of the STX EPDS to hurri-
canes?
• Research Question 2 (RQ2): What is the vulnerability of the STX WDS to pump
station failures?
• Research Question 3 (RQ3): What is the interdependent vulnerability of the STX
EPDS and WDS?
A second goal of this thesis is to produce results that are operationally relevant to USVI
stakeholders. To ensure that outputs of this thesis are operationally useful to VIWAPA and
other stakeholders, this thesis also involves three general research tasks:
• Data Curation and Management: We compile, update, and modify data provided
by VIWAPA and related collaborators for VIWAPA EPDS and WDS for STX. We
conduct data curation and management activities to enable the analysis of system
operation and present analysis results in formats useful for stakeholder engagement.
• System Operation Modeling: We model the operation of the STX EPDS and
WDS.We develop and implement relevant models to measure the impacts of natural
disasters on both systems.
• Model Analysis and Visualization: We analyze EPDS and WDS model outputs to
determine best-case and worst-case scenarios for the operation of both systems. We
visualize model outputs and analysis to demonstrate possible recommendations to
improve system resilience.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. We provide a technical background to
determine methods for vulnerability analysis of independent and interdependent power and
water systems in Chapter 2. Then, we organizemethods relevant to the STXEPDS andWDS
case study in Chapter 3. We implement methods to assess the hurricane vulnerabilities and




In this chapter, we review relevant research to identify methods to model and analyze
the vulnerability of the STX electric power distribution system and water distribution
system to hurricanes. We present a general overview of critical infrastructure systems and
their vulnerability and specific studies related to the EPDS and WDS systems and their
interdependencies. We emphasize the use of operator models for EPDS and WDS and
introduce mathematical models useful for measuring system operations during hurricane
disasters.
2.1 Critical Infrastructure Systems and Vulnerabilities
2.1.1 Defining Critical Infrastructure Systems
The modern study of critical infrastructure vulnerability and resilience emerged from U.S.
federal policy over the last 20 years. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 provided
one of the earliest definitions of Critical Infrastructure (CI) (The White House 1998) as,
“physical and cyber-based systems which are essential for the minimum operations of
economy and government“ (p. 1). At that time CI systems included but were not limited
to telecommunications, energy, water, banking and finance, and transportation among
others. This historical definition of CI is similar to the current definition used in federal
policy established with the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive 21 as, “critical infrastructure
provides the essential services that underpin American society” (The White House 2013).
Currently, CI systems comprise 16 sectors (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2019).
Many CI systems share features that make them vulnerable to many different threats (Willis
et al. 2018). Some threats are man-made, and include adversaries and terrorist organizations
that wish to cause harm to the communities that depend on CI systems. Natural hazards
such as earthquakes or hurricanes, pose a unique threat to CI systems due to their extreme
impacts. (The White House 1998).
Importantly, CI systems are complex systems of interacting and interdependent components
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making them vulnerable to cascading failures when one or more components fail (Rinaldi
et al. 2001). As shown in Figure 2.1, there are numerous interdependencies identified
between CI systems. For example, the electric power system is at the center of the figure,
because it is connected to all other subsystems. A failure in the electric power distribution
would cause failures in all other systems as well. This is evidenced in the USVI context, as
the STX WDS was reliant on electric power to run the pumps and to control the system.
Interdependent critical infrastructure comprises more than water and power sys-
tems. CI is a system encompassing different systems that work together and
depend on each other. Source: Rinaldi et al. (2001).
Figure 2.1. Interdependencies of infrastructure systems.
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One of the most important questions raised in U.S. policy for CI systems is how to measure
the way system interdependencies affect system operations. In other words, how long can a
CI system operate when a failure occurs in another, interdependent system? Furthermore,
how can we harden the different systems to minimize the effects of interdependent failures?
2.1.2 Assessing CI Vulnerabilities
There exist established methods for making sense of CI threats and evaluating consequences
across CI systems. A simple mathematical way to describe CI risk provides a common
method experts relate CI threats, vulnerability, and consequences (Kaplan and Garrick
1981):
Risk = probability · vulnerability · consequence. (2.1a)
Equation (2.1a) emphasizes that there are three primary tasks to analyze the vulnerability of
a CI system to a given threat like a hurricane. The first task is to determine the probability
that a threat happens at a certain time in a certain area. The second task is developing
measures of consequence caused by the threat. For this it is important to compare the
function of CI in normal operations to post-disaster states.
These two parts lead to the analysis of vulnerability. Combining the threat likelihood and
the estimation of consequences provides a basis to recommend hardening of infrastructure
systems, develop new and better components for systems, or make emergency plans for
worst-case scenarios. For risk-based decisions, it is important to take local context into
account when evaluating the probability and the consequences for infrastructure systems.
Some locations are more vulnerable to specific kinds of threats, and the analysis has
to weigh the probability of such threats, as well as the consequences to make the best
recommendations.
Assessing Natural Hazard Threats
Natural disasters pose a unique threat to CI systems. There are several different types of
natural disasters which impact the functioning of CI systems, and not every disaster impacts
every CI system in the same way. The threat from a natural hazard depends on several
factors, such as where the system is located in the United States and how the system is
15
designed. For example, the risk of tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, and winter storms
differ depending on the region within the continental United States (see Figure 2.2).
Examples of the risk of natural disasters in the continental United States. Upper
left: Tsunami; upper right: Hurricane; lower left: Earthquake; lower right: Winter
Storm. Adapted from Forensics (2018).
Figure 2.2. Risk of natural disasters.
There are several different ways to estimate the impacts of hurricanes on CI systems. One
way is to look at historical data and estimate the probability of failure by historical record.
If there is enough data available one can create fragility curves that estimate the probability
of infrastructure failure by comparing broken components and elements of a CI system
and the components that survived. Fragility curves are failure probabilities of a certain
component over a changing value, in particular, wind speed for this thesis. Important for
this procedure are the accuracy and completeness of the data. As more data becomes
available, the estimation of CI system fragility will be more accurate.
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If there is not enough data available, it is possible to create fragility curves using stochastic
methods. To construct fragility curves for complicated components likewooden utility poles
in an electric power system, we can use the reliability engineering stress-strength method
(Anders 1989). The mathematical formulation of this method is a probability of exceedance
P(X < Y ) where X is the strength of a given component and Y is the stress reacting with
this component caused by a disaster like a hurricane or an earthquake (Kotz and Pensky
2003). The stress-strength model determines the probability that the stress exceeds the
strength of the component, leading to component failure. The values for the stress and the
strength are computed with physical properties of the natural disaster and the component,
and it is possible to compute these values with uncertainty and in a stochastic way. For
example, it is possible to construct fragility curves with Monte Carlo simulation (Salman
2016). These functions, also called hazard functions or damage functions (Habermann and
Hedel 2018), measure the probability of a failure or damage over a certain stress caused by
natural disasters in terms of wind speed or earthquake magnitude.
Assessing Failure Consequences
A critical step for CI vulnerability analysis is developing a model to measure the conse-
quences of system failure. Experts in CI system modeling emphasize the use of operator
models for assessing CI system failures and consequences (Brown et al. 2006; Alderson
et al. 2014, 2015). A CI operator model is often an optimization or simulation model that
contains objectives and constraints. The constraints determine what the system is able to
do with respect to physical laws and capacities. The objectives capture the CI function and
provide a measure of how well the system responds to disruptions (Alderson et al. 2015).
There are different ways to measure the function of CI systems under different disruptions.
For network flow operator models, the objective is typically of a form to minimize a
combination of different kinds of flow costs. This cost can take different forms, like
measuring the amount of unsatisfied consumers or the cost for improving and hardening
the system under the threat of a hazard. It depends on the kind of CI system under analysis
(Brown et al. 2006).
Tomake predictions about the operational resilience and vulnerability of a CI system, Dixon
(2011) described three common kinds of analysis. The first, involves the consideration of
a single scenario. This scenario can be built out of historical data or out of an imaginary
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scenario one wants to test. In general, the scenario represents a disruption of certain
components of a CI system, e.g., a combination of failures of different transformer or lines
in an electric power grid or broken pumps in a water distributions network. This type of
analysis answers the questions what happens under a special combination of circumstances
(“what-if”).
A second type of analysis is to measure the expected performance of a system subjected to
many failure scenarios. This is similar in practice to “what-if” analysis. The difference here
is that the scenario is not built from historical or deterministic data; instead, it is the result
of a stochastic process. This process can be produced using different forms of simulation
techniques, e.g., Monte Carlo simulation for computing the probability of pole failure in a
certain hurricane scenario (Salman et al. 2015) (“what-ifs”).
The third type of analysis is a worst-case analysis. This approach uses optimization to
develop a bi- or trilevel model to apply attacker-defender methods to a CI system. These
models find the worst combination of component failures in a CI system such that the
failures maximize the cost of system operation (Brown et al. 2006; Alderson et al. 2015).
Worst-case analysis is also possible with systems dynamics, agent-based, input-output, and
other interdependent operator models (Ouyang 2014).
Recommending Resilient CI System Designs and Operations
A purpose of assessing CI vulnerability is to recommend ways to improve and harden
CI systems. There are two common ways to harden critical infrastructure. The first is to
improve operations and procedures. Here, the output from vulnerability assessment ismeant
to develop new ways to operate CI systems. Example recommendations include emergency
procedures for building and developing backup systems and emergency shut-off procedures
or the creation of new system structures and functions that reduce failure consequences
(Brown et al. 2006, 2005).
The second way to improve a CI system is to develop and harden the components of the
system to make them less likely to fail. This analysis should go together with the hazard
risk analysis in this area. One example is developing and installing new power distribution
poles in a power grid are more robust to natural hazards (RS Composite Utility Poles 2019).
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2.2 Electric Power Distribution Systems and Hurricane
Vulnerabilities
2.2.1 Electric Power Distribution Systems
A power grid consists of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution as shown in
Figure 2.3. Electricity is traditionally generated by power plants that use fuels such as oil,
coal, or nuclear energy. In a modern power grid, in addition to these classic energy sources,
new small producers are added, which are essentially small generators such as solar systems
on the rooftops of consumers. Here, a consumer’s own demand is covered before the surplus
energy is fed into the power grid. Thus, this type of energy generation is a component of
energy distribution at the consumer level.
Overview of an electric power grid with power generation, power transmission and
power distribution. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2019).
Figure 2.3. Overview power grid.
For electricity transmission, the energy generated in the power plants is transformed to a
higher voltage level and then transmitted over long distances. The transmission and the
voltage level differ mainly by short, medium and long transmission lines. The short cables
are designed for a length of 50 km and transmit electric current with a voltage of less than
20 kilo Volt (kV). The medium transmission lines have a length between 50 km and 150
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km and carry a voltage of 20 kV to 100 kV. The transmission over long distances greater
than 150 km is ensured with a voltage of >100 kV (Sadhu and Das 2015).
When the electricity reaches its intended location, it is transformed to a lower voltage
level of (<15 kV) and then distributed to consumers in several stages, before finally being
transformed to the required voltage. The required voltage depends on the type and size of
the consumer. For example, individual households need voltages of 110 Volt (V), 230 V,
or 400 V, and larger consumers, such as industry and hospitals, need a voltage of a few kV
(Sadhu and Das 2015).
2.2.2 Hurricane Impacts on Electric Power Distribution Systems
The loss of electricity due to hurricanes and other natural disasters can have a significant
impact to communities. Loss of electric power prevents people from living their daily life
and can slow down reconstruction work after a natural disaster. Furthermore, important
infrastructure and aid facilities that lose electricity may not be able to operate. For example,
hospitals, law enforcement, and governmental agencies are not able to provide security.
An EPDS consists of several different elements that can fail during disasters. In addition
to consumers and other connecting elements, power lines and transformers play the most
important role in the system. Each element has a different probability of failing when
exposed to a hurricane or other natural disaster.
The key factor determining the probability of failure is whether elements are buried un-
derground or overhead on power poles. The way cables are installed depends on many
different factors such as geography, soil conditions and of course the costs. Whether a cable
is routed above ground with distribution poles or underground, has a significant impact on
the resilience of the entire system in the event of disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes
or heavy rainfall.
For a system with underground power lines and transformers, hurricane damage is mainly
caused by large amounts of water, such as that caused by a storm surge. According to Ma
et al. (2016) the biggest danger for underground systems is debris, salt, and the water itself
when a hurricane approaches from the ocean to land.
Electricity infrastructure above ground on overhead lines is even more vulnerable to hur-
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ricane disasters. Excessive water from flooding as well as high wind speeds can damage
utility poles in several ways. First of all there is the impact of the power of the hazard itself.
Wind speeds and flooding can cause poles to be removed from the ground. Salman et al.
(2015) creates fragility curves with the help of the strength-stress method and Monte Carlo
simulation. Here, it is possible to make a stochastic analysis to map the failure probabilities
for utility poles as a function of wind speeds in a hurricane (Figure 2.4).
Fragility curves of three-phase line poles at different ages created with Monte Carlo
simulations. Source: Salman et al. (2015).
Figure 2.4. Fragility curves of wooden utility poles.
2.2.3 Operator Models of Electric Power Distribution Systems
The structure of an EPDS also has a major impact on its function. EPDSs are often
differentiated into radial systems, ring systems, and interconnected systems (Sadhu and
Das 2015). In particular, the operation of each system leads to different vulnerability, and
redundancy plays an important role. For example, a radial system has only a single path
from high voltage substations to customers. Here, all customers can be affected by a single
failure near the substation. In contrast, a ring and interconnected system have multiple paths
to distribute electricity to customers. These systems can still serve customers in multiple,
redundant ways.
Determining how power flows to customers across radial, ring, and interconnected systems
is achieved using power system operator models. Calculating power flow in an EPDSs is
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often performed using Alternating Current Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) models (Barnes
et al. 2017). These models take into account the physical constraints and laws of distribution
of electrical energy, and thus calculate the optimal flow throughout the system based on
operational objectives. Different ACOPFmodels maymodel the same physics with different
objectives. For example, the cost of improving a system can be calculated through various
types of measures and the cheapest solution can be optimized (Lipka et al. 2013; Nagarajan
et al. 2016; Zamzam et al. 2016). Another possibility is to minimize the overall load shed
in the system when it is subjected to failures (Barnes et al. 2017; Nagarajan et al. 2016).
This means that the optimal electricity flow is calculated so that as few users as possible are
under-supplied (Petri 2017).
Recent work uses ACOPF to study hurricane impacts on EPDSs. The study of Nagarajan
et al. (2016) focuses on the hardening of a power system to hurricanes while minimizing
the improvement costs and optimizing the performance of the system. Another study
conducted by Lipka et al. (2013) looks for optimal switching in a transmission system. In
this study a linearized and approximated version of the ACOPF model is used to increase
the computational performance and speed.
2.2.4 Hardening andProtection ofElectric PowerDistributionSystems
to Hurricanes
There are at least two different ways to harden and improve EPDSs to hurricanes. The first
option is to develop new procedures or emergency operations. One example is to categorize
and prioritize the loads and customers like mentioned in Banerjee et al. (2018) and develop
shut-off procedures to focus the power flow in a case of emergency like a blackout or a
hurricane.
Another possibility is to make the system more robust and redundant by changing the
physical components and structure of the system. Brown (2017) gives an overview of
the different options to harden elements of overhead EPDSs to hurricanes. Foremost is
hardening power poles and transformers. One option is to replace wooden power poles with
power poles made of stronger materials, like composite or steel, or by changing the pole
design (weight, visual impact, corrosion resistance, etc.). Another alternative is to reinforce
existing poles, such as through supporting structures like a steel brace below the ground line
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or a fiber-glass wrap (Brown 2017). Another option is to improve the hardware on poles
(insulators, crossarms, conductor ties, conductors, brackets, etc.) by using othermaterials or
new designs. A final option is to increase strength by reducing the pole-mounted equipment
and the third party attachments.
In addition to these options, there are others that change the system structure. For example,
the entire EPDS layout can change by installing additional, redundant power lines. Re-
dundancy ensures that in the case of line failure the electric power is redirected over other
(redundant) lines to the customers. Simpler options are to increase the number of power
poles and shorten the spans. This option will increase the wind rating of poles and lines as
well.
Finally, the most expensive but also effective way to harden an above-ground system is to
bury all lines and change the system to an underground system. The costs here depend on
the area where the underground installation is planned. That means there is a wide range of
costs. For example, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) estimates costs for undergrounding
power lines can vary from $158,100 to $1,960,000 per mile for rural systems (Hall 2013)
(Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Costs for undergrounding overhead power lines
Urban Suburban Rural
Min $1,000,000 $313,000 $158,100
Max $5,000,000 $2,420,000 $1,960,000
Ranges on the Cost per Mile for Converting Overhead Power Lines to Underground.
Adapted from Hall (2013).
One current project of VIWAPA on STJ focuses on undergrounding important parts of
the power distribution system. This project aims to move 5.2 miles of three-phase feeders
underground at an estimated cost of $1,501,984, which means that the average cost per mile
for this project is about $288,850 (VIWAPA 2018).
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2.3 Water Distribution Systems and Hurricane Vulnera-
bilities
2.3.1 Water Distribution Systems
A WDS is composed of a source like a spring or a reservoir, pipes, treatment facilities,
storage tanks, pumps, valves, and other inline equipment (Figure 2.5). In a WDS, water
is collected, stored, or recovered from a source. A water source can be natural, such
as a lake or a water production facility such as a desalination plant that turns ocean salt
water intro drinking water. From the water source, fresh water is pumped through storage
tanks, pumping stations, and inline WDS management equipment, such as valves and flow
controllers, to reach customers. In pipeline systems, sufficient water pressure is required
to deliver water to a customer. Achieving necessary pressure is possible via pumping
water into tanks at a high elevation, and then using gravity to reach customers. If there
is no natural slope, then water pumps are required to establish enough pressure to reach
customers (Figure 2.5).
Overview over a fresh water distribution system, including water source, treatment,
storage, pumping, pipelines, and customers. Source: United States Environmental
Protection Agency (2019).
Figure 2.5. General Structure of a Water Distribution System
Since it is particularly important for a WDS to keep the pressure high and constant, it is also
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important to consider the effect on water distribution of the diameters of pipes throughout
the system. Specifically, pipe diameters are chosen depending on the water consumption of
the consumer. Pipes with large diameter serving a few customers will lead to water pressure
drops and not enough water will reach the consumer. If the diameter is too small the
pressure is constantly high, but the flow rate may still be insufficient to supply all customers
as needed (Bunn 2018).
2.3.2 Hurricane Impacts on Water Distribution Systems
Like the hurricane itself, loss of WDS also creates catastrophic impacts to the communities
and customers they serve. Fresh water is one of the most important goods not only for
private households but also for medical and food facilities. The quality of people’s life
and their satisfaction is impacted when the WDS fails to operate. Moreover, according to
Freeman (2015), one of the major consequences of WDS failure is a breach of public trust
and the inability to ensure future growth and development.
The physical elements of a WDS can fail when exposed to hurricanes. Specifically, hur-
ricane induced flooding can expose underground infrastructure and make above ground
systems nonoperational and inaccessible. Hurricanes wind speeds can also be destruc-
tive for exposed above ground systems like pumps, flow meters, valves, and inline water
regulation equipment.
There are several common approaches tomodel hurricane impacts onWDS. One of themost
common impacts of flooding is ground subsidence that creates leaks in pipeline systems.
Leak impacts can be modeled for WDS operations using the leak equation developed by
Crowl and Louvar (2001):





In Equation (2.2) dleak is a fictional “demand” caused by the leak, Cd is the discharge
coefficient which is unitless, A is the area of the leak hole, α is the discharge coefficient,
p is the pipe pressure and ρ is the density of water. Using Equation (2.2), it is possible to
add leaks to any tank or pipe. Also pipe breaks are modeled with the help of this method
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by setting the diameter of the leak hole to the diameter of the pipe (Klise et al. 2017).
A second important effect of a hurricane is the impact on the water quality. This might be
caused by physical damage to equipment when dirt, bacteria and waste water make their
way into the drinking water system. During hurricanes this is often caused by a flood or
storm surge infiltrating the working water system. This kinds of damage has a large impact
on customers and can cause disease in large populations. It is also especially difficult to
detect small damage on pipes where bacteria can come into the system and so the water
quality can remain bad for a long period of time (Mosley et al. 2004).
Several recent works studying disaster impacts on a WDS are relevant for this work. Chang
et al. (2002) studied the impacts of an earthquake on water systems and their consequences
to urban economies using Equation (2.2) to measure impacts. Their model is capable of
comparing several kinds of actions to reduce expected costs and losses after a disaster,
including pre-disaster mitigation and the post-disaster emergency response. Also, research
conducted by Khan et al. (2015) gives an overview of the impacts of the different kinds of
disasters and reviews some of the important literature regarding water quality in Australia.
Khan et al. (2015) conclude that there should be more guidance and emergency operations
in the water management.
2.3.3 Operator Models of Water Distribution Systems
Operating a water distribution system focuses on keeping enough pressure throughout the
pipeline to serve customer demand. How people operate pumps, tanks, valves, and other
equipment depends on a trade-off between emergency procedures (e.g., firefighting flow),
water quality, and energy efficiency. As Walski (1996) pointed out, it is important to
maximize the reliability of the system by keeping tanks filled at a high level. In contrast, it
is also important to run the pumps as infrequently as possible to save energy and operating
costs, which keeps water tanks at a low level. Maintaining good water quality also requires
balancing the system, and the water within tanks needs to be constantly replaced to ensure
the residence time within the tanks does not last long enough to promote bacterial growth.
AWDS in a computer simulation and optimization is often modelled as a water distribution
network. The physical components of the real system are characterized as nodes and links
in the WDS model. Pipes and pumps are represented as links while reservoirs, sources,
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tanks, valves, and junctions are represented as nodes (Bunn 2018). All components of
the network are assigned physical characteristics required to model water flow, including
materials, lengths, diameters, internal roughness, locations, elevations, and pump curves
among others.
Constructing a network model for a given WDS requires specialized computer software.
For systems with geospatial data, each part of the WDS can be modeled with the Quantum
Geographic Information System (QGIS), a free and open source Geographic Information
system (GIS) software (QGIS Development Team 2019). To measure pipeline flows and
pressure, theGIS data can be converted into an input file for the software EPANET. EPANET
was developed by the United States United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2019) specifically for the design and management
of WDSs.
Due to the non-linear physics of pipeline flow, operator models for a WDS focus on
simulation methods rather than optimization. In general, all WDS simulations complete
the mathematical process of hydraulic balancing, where changes in head are calculated
over network links and flows, and pressures are determined at the nodes. There are two
different methods to simulate hydraulic balancing. The first method is the Demand Driven
Flow (DDF), which is the method implemented in EPANET. This simulation assumes
the demands at the nodes is known and the pressure throughout the WDS will serve the
demand (Bunn 2018). Mohapatra et al. (2014) used this kind of model to help verifying the
suitability of water infrastructure systems in developing countries.
The second method for WDS simulation is the Pressure Driven Demand (PDD). This
method includes non-linear losses of pressure and demands based on possible water pres-
sure and flow rates in the system (Bunn 2018). PDD is a more effective way to test
emergency situations and operating conditions because demand will be curtailed for broken
and unavailable WDS equipment. Previous work with this model by Shuang et al. (2014)
claims that PDD simulation is a more realistic way to model and simulate WDSs from
an operator’s perspective. The PDD method has been used by several authors to test the
impacts of natural disasters and pipeline failures on the ability of a WDS to deliver water to
customers. For example, Giustolisi et al. (2008) used the PDD to simulate leakages in the
water system and based on this to optimize the flow and the satisfaction of the customers.
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In another application of this model, Shuang et al. (2014) conducted a study to determine
the vulnerability of nodes in the WDS due to cascading failures.
Recently, theWater Network Tool for Resilience (WNTR) (Klise et al. 2018) was developed
to have the functionality of both the DDF from EPANET and the PDD hydraulic balancing
methods. WNTR is a software package for the Python programming language (Python
2017) that was developed by EPA together with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL).
WNTR extends the capabilities of EPANET by having the possibility to simulate a wider
set of scenarios and includes models for leaks and disaster incidents for WDS. For example,
Bunn (2018) uses WNTR to simulate simple WDS and especially to show impacts of
interdependencies between water and power infrastructure. Furthermore, WNTR is capable
of implementing stochastic disaster scenarios and selecting the probability of failure from
fragility curves.
2.3.4 Hardening and Protection ofWater Distribution Systems toHur-
ricanes
Shuang et al. (2019) reviews the different capabilities necessary to improve the resilience
of a WDS. In general, increasing the robustness of a WDS via hardening and improvements
strategies is necessary to prepare theWDS for natural hazards like hurricanes. Shuang et al.
(2019) separate robustness capabilities into three different types based on how they protect
WDSs from disasters: absorptive, restorative, and adaptive capabilities.
The absorptive capability of a WDS is necessary so the system survives major disasters like
a hurricane. Strategies for improving this capability are hardening components like tanks
and pumps, improving the real-time management and monitoring of the WDS, and making
the system more redundant and flexible against uncertain events. Disaster absorption is
improved by installing new lines, equipping the tanks and pumping stationswith transmitters
that improve system monitoring, and by installing additional, redundant components like
water tanks, pumps, valves, or backup power generators. Furthermore, it is important to
harden important components, such as building special shelters around pumping stations
and valves and by strengthening the foundation of tanks and reservoirs.
Recent work assessing the absorptive capacity of WDSs include Nazif and Karamouz
(2009) and Diao et al. (2016). Nazif and Karamouz (2009) develop an algorithm to assess
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the readiness of WDSs in worst-case scenarios. In this study, the algorithm is applied to
parts of the WDS in the city Teheran, Iran. Results show the importance of emergency and
contingency plans in absorbing disaster impacts. Diao et al. (2016) studyWDS resilience by
developing a method for global resilience analysis. The authors develop ways to analyze the
resilience of a WDS to physical failures or incidents like pipe breaks, substance intrusion,
and firefighting. Methods developed by the authors offer a way to test and verify WDS
hardening methods.
The restorative capability of a WDS centers on how the system responds after a disruption.
Furthermore, this capability describes the speed and the degree of recovery. Diao et al.
(2016) describe that the best ways to improve this capability are to develop emergency
response plans, increase capabilities to identify failed or broken components as soon as
possible, develop ways to prioritize maintenance, and to store and allocate resources that
support a quick repair of crucial components.
Restorative capabilities of WDSs are also studied by Giustolisi and Savic (2010). Here,
the authors show the importance of locating and isolating failed segments of the WDS.
The authors identify that minimizing a WDS disruption requires specific system valves to
be closed. Thus, it is important to identify the location of the disruption as precisely as
possible.
The adaptive capability of a WDS focuses on system diversity such that the WDS can
manage different kinds of impacts, incidents, and disasters. Diao et al. (2016) emphasize
that, due to climate change, it is not possible to predict the incidents that will impact WDSs.
In light of this, ways to improve this capability are optimizing the components, hardening
the connection points of critical infrastructure, and always updating existing systems with
new components.
2.4 Interdependent Water and Power Systems
2.4.1 Impact of Interdependencies on Water-Power Systems
Out of all CI systems, Rinaldi et al. (2001) suggest that electricity and water systems pose
a unique challenge. Electric power and water systems are interdependent; when either the
electricity or the water supply system fails, there is the possibility that the failure can impact
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the functioning of the other system (Bunn 2018; Clark et al. 2019). The direct effects
depend on how water is used by the electric power system and how electricity is used by the
water supply system. Thus, depending on the context and how coupled the local electricity
and water systems are, threats to one system are actually threats to both.
Lubega and Farid (2014b) create a generic systemmodel to show all the different dependen-
cies across EPDSs and WDSs. Failure in any part of this interdependent system can cause
losses across both. For example, loss of WDS function can lead to loss of an EPDS. One of
the most common dependencies is when EPDS generators and transformers need water for
cooling (Clark et al. 2019). If these dependencies exist, when theWDS fails, generators can
shut off and the EPDS can also fail. Loss of an EPDS, in turn, can also cause aWDS failure.
There are several WDS components that need electric power to work, including pumps and
controls (Clark et al. 2019). Loss of an EPDS can lead to the immediate shutdown of critical
WDS components and loss of pressure (Lubega and Farid 2014a).
2.4.2 Operator Models of Interdependent Water and Power Systems
There are several different methods for modeling the interdependencies between an EPDS
and a WDS (Dickenson 2014; Gun 2013; Ruether 2015). One method is just to extend the
objective function of one system by assigning cost for using resources from the other. For
example, if a WDS uses electricity from an EPDS to run pumps, the objective function for
the WDS operator model can include additional costs for electricity usage. This method
is employed by Fooladivanda and Taylor (2017) to compute energy-optimal scheduling for
a WDS. Oikonomou et al. (2017) developed a model, to use the flexibility of the energy
usage of the water system to determine an optimal scheduling plan for the use of pumps in
the system. That approach avoids significant peaks in the power flow in the EPDS because
of a large unexpected and unscheduled demand for energy.
A second method is to integrate a simulation across WDS and EDPS operator models, such
that the result from one is an input to the other, and vice versa. Here, if there are some
broken components in the power system, the EPDS model computes the effects and then
sends the result as input data to the water system. Bunn (2018) uses this method to examine
the consequences of damages in the power system to the water system with Python-based
models for ACOPF and PDD. Similarly, Khatavkar and Mays (2018) and Khatavkar (2019)
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assess the similar power impacts on a WDS using a genetic algorithm and EPANET to
measure WDS response with optimal pump scheduling. Zuloaga et al. (2019) build on
Khatavkar and Mays (2018) to include a security-constrained unit commitment problem for
EPDS power delivery alongside WDS pump optimization and dispatch.
A third method is to combine objective functions and constraints of EPDS andWDS into to
a single program. Zamzam et al. (2018) formulated an optimal water-power flow (OWPF)
problem as a linear program. The original problem is a non-convex quadratic problem
solved by using the Feasible Point Pursuit Successive Convex Approximation (FPP-SCA)
(Mehanna et al. 2014). With this model it is possible to optimize the use of controllable
components in the WDS and in an EPDS. The result is a model formulation that makes sure
that the pumps and tanks in the WDS are used efficiently relative to power availability.
2.4.3 Hardening and Protection of Interdependent Water and Power
Systems
Similar to improving the operational resilience of a single CI system, methods for improving
the operational resilience of interdependent EPDS and WDS often differ, i.e., improving
emergency plans and increasing system robustness to failures.
Improving interdependent planning is one method to manage disasters (USVI Hurricane
Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). Here, there are several interdependent consid-
erations. First, it is important to categorize loads and customers in both systems according
to their importance. As mentioned earlier, a hospital or a governmental institution is
more important for the public life than a single customer or a household. Sharkey et al.
(2015) conduct research on the Interdependent Integrated Network Design and Scheduling
(IINDS) problem where they focus on the restoration of different kinds of infrastructure
after a natural disaster. Also Nurre et al. (2012) have contributed some case studies related
to restoring interdependent infrastructure using an own Integrated Network Design and
Scheduling (INDS) problem. It is also important to pre-plan the backup components and
parts of both systems to establish the responsible authority with the opportunity to speed up
interdependent maintenance (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018).
Improving the robustness of interdependent EPDS andWDS relies on hardening the physical
components of both systems. Here, methods remain largely the same for independent EPDS
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and WDS systems, but prioritization focuses on their interdependencies. For example,
recommendations can be made for hardening the power lines that serve the critical parts
of the WDS. Moreover, hardening can be done to keep critical loads in both systems
operational, for example, for hospitals or law enforcement buildings (Taylor et al. 2002).
2.5 Our Contribution
The events of Hurricanes Irma andMaria reveal that specific EPDS andWDS vulnerabilities
and interdependencies require investigation. As Irma and Maria emphasize, hurricanes
represent one of the primary natural disasters that challenge the STX EPDS and WDS.
These events are punctuated by extreme winds, heavy rainfall, and storm surge. Based on
literature and real-world experience during and after Irma and Maria, it is evident that the
EPDSs across STT, STJ, and STX are all vulnerable to these disasters. This is because the
majority of USVI power infrastructure is above ground on wooden power poles that can
be ripped out of the ground by extreme winds, destroyed by debris strikes, or toppled by
extreme flooding.
While previous studies developed the necessary fragility curves to assess potential loss of
EPDS infrastructure, these methods have rarely been used alongside EPDS operator models
to assess the implications of component failures. Moreover, these methods have never been
implemented for any USVI EPDS to measure how increasing hurricane disasters affect
power delivery. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature.
Second, while USVI water infrastructure was not destroyed due to direct damage from
hurricane hazards, all system operation is vulnerable to electric power outages. The USVI
water operations depend on electricity from each island’s EPDS to run pumping stations and
ensure enough pressure is within theWDS.While majority of studies onwater infrastructure
during disasters focus on the failure of pipes due to leaks or power outages, these studies
do not take into account the operation of an entire EPDS or its vulnerability to hurricanes.
Moreover, these studies tend to focus on short timeframes, when power outages in the USVI
post-Irma and Maria lasted for upwards of three months. No studies focus on how long
systems can survive given multiple blackout scenarios for extended periods. This thesis
also addresses this gap in the literature.
We build upon the technical methods presented earlier to analyze the vulnerability of the
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STX EPDS and WDS. We focus on developing operator models for the STX EPDS and
WDS as an initial case study of water-power interdependencies in the USVI. Specifically,
we study the vulnerability of the STX EPDS to hurricane force winds and determine the
benefits of different system hardening options using ACOPF operator models and Monte
Carlo methods. We further study the vulnerability of the STX WDS to electric power
outages and, using PDD extended period simulations in WNTR, determine the benefits of
different resilient operations. Combined, these two studies inform the vulnerability of the
STX WDS to electric power outages and recommend ways to harden the STX EPDS to
support interdependent operations.
This chapter provides important information about stochastic simulation of fragility curves
and deterministic operator models for power and water systems. Furthermore, it tells about
the ways we prepared the data for the analysis and simulation.
Chapter 3 tailors these information to the research in this thesis and the interdependent
water and power systems on STX. Furthermore Chapter 3 shows how we build the models
and verify the functionality.
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CHAPTER 3:
Models, Methods, and Scenarios
This thesis makes technical contributions for (i) data curation, management, and visualiza-
tion as well as (ii) system modeling and analysis useful for understanding interdependent
electric power and water systems on the island of STX. We organize our research methods
according to three research questions.
ResearchQuestion 1 (RQ1): What is the vulnerability of the STXEPDS to hurricanes?
• Data Curation, Management, and Visualization: We curate STX EPDS data for
analysis using optimization models created in the Python programming language
(Section 3.1.1).
• System Modeling and Analysis: We develop hurricane scenarios and vulnerability
analysis of the STX EPDS to hurricanes (Section 3.1.2). We further analyze optimal
STX EPDS operations during hurricanes (Section 3.1.3) and compare benefits of
EPDS hardening to hurricanes (Section 3.1.4).
ResearchQuestion 2 (RQ2): What is the vulnerability of the STXWDS toHurricanes?
• Data Curation, Management, and Visualization: We create a STX WDS model
for analysis using simulation tools created in the Python programming language
(Section 3.2.1).
• System Modeling and Analysis: We generate scenarios for pump station outages due
to hurricanes (Section 3.2.2). Then, we analyze the vulnerability of the STX WDS
during electricity outages (Section 3.2.3).
Research Question 3 (RQ3): What design and operational recommendations can
manage EPDS and WDS interdependent vulnerabilities?
• Analysis and Visualization: We map results from the STX EPDS vulnerability as-
sessment to determine hurricane-induced blackout impacts on STX water operations
(Section 3.3).
We elaborate on each research question.
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3.1 RQ1: Vulnerability Analysis of the St. Croix Electric
Power Distribution System to Hurricane Disasters
3.1.1 The STX Electric Power Distribution System
The EPDS on STX has one power plant located in Christiansted with six fossil fuel gener-
ators. The generated power is transmitted from the power plant to Richmond and Midland
substations via high-voltage underground transmission lines.
Electric power distribution starts at the two substations. Six feeder power lines from Rich-
mond substation and four feeder power lines from Midland substation distribute electricity
to electricity customers (Figure 3.1). The Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority give
feeders numerical names followed by a letter indicating which substation they originate
from. EPDS operations treat every feeder independent of the others for power distribution
and serving customer load. As noted in Figure 3.1, feeder line 04a is omitted in this analysis
because there were issues with the line’s data at the time of analysis.
Location and connectivity of substations and feeder power lines on STX. Richmond
substation is in the north of the island and Midland substation in the middle of the
island. Feeders 01a to 06a connect to Richmond substation. Feeders 06b to 10b
connect to Midland substation. Note: Feeder 04a is not included in the figure
because data was unavailable at time of analysis. Created by author with RStudio
and Leaflet on November 29, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015; Graul 2016).
Figure 3.1. The St. Croix (STX) Electric Power Distribution System (EPDS).
In addition to the feeder power lines, transformers, reactors, low-voltage power lines con-
necting feeders to customers, and customer loads are required to determine power flow. The
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total number of STX EPDS elements for each feeder power line is presented in Figure 3.2.
Minor issues with data mean the values of EPDS elements of each feeder are not precisely
the same as the real systems. Nevertheless, the deviation from the real STX EPDS is
small. Furthermore, future work will enable synthetic data to be created to deal with any
discrepancies (Lave 2019).
Number of STX EPDS components sorted by feeder power line and type (Trans-
former, Line, Load). Feeder lines 01a to 06a are connected to the Richmond
Substation. Feeder lines 06b to 10b connected to the Midland Substation. Note:
Data for Feeder 04a was not available and is ignored in results and analysis. Cre-
ated by author with RStudio on November 29, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 3.2. Number of components in the STX EPDS.
3.1.2 Hurricane Disaster Impacts on the USVI Electric Power Distri-
bution System
To model the impacts of hurricane disasters, we construct fragility curves for power poles in
the STX EPDS using methods similar to those in Salman et al. (2015). We use the fragility
curve to estimate the probability of a component failure by using technical standards and
physical laws. The vulnerability of STX EPDS components depends on whether elements
are underground or above ground on power poles.
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For underground components the most dangerous hurricane hazard is flooding caused by
rain, storm surge, or sea level rise. The failure probability of underground components is
estimated by the following linear function (Ma et al. 2016):
pung,i j = [a + b · (H − Sz)] · I(H − Sz)
where I(H − Sz) =

1 if H − Sz ≥ 0
0 if H − Sz ≤ 0
(3.1)
Let i and j denote the two endpoints of an underground electric power line, pung,i j,t is the
probability of failure of line i j, Sz is the storm surge category, H is the category of hurricane,
and a and b are tuning parameters. Equation (3.1) measures the probability an underground
power line i j will fail due to hurricane winds (Xu and Brown 2008). Hurricane categories
with wind speeds and storm surge are presented in Table 3.1. Storm surge is the dome of
water which is pushed ashore by high wind speeds (U.S. Navy 2019). The locations on
STX impacted by storm surge is presented in Appendix A. Because these locations do not
correspond with power infrastructure, we assume that there is no impact of storm surge on
the STX EPDS.
Table 3.1. Hurricane wind speed and storm surge categories defined by
Schott et al. (2012) & U.S. Navy (2019)
Category Wind Speed [mph] Storm surge [ft]
1 74 - 95 4 - 5
2 96 - 110 6 - 8
3 111 - 129 9 - 12
4 130 - 156 13 - 18
6 >157 >18
For above-ground components, the most dangerous hazard is high winds that can cause
infrastructure component failure and debris strikes. We construct non-linear fragility
curves for hurricane-force winds using the stress-strength method from Salman (2016)
38
and Darestani and Shafieezadeh (2019):
F = QKzKztV2GC f A (3.2a)
S = Fh (3.2b)
R(t) = R0[1 − min(max(a1t − a2, 0), 1) · min(max(b1tb2, 0), 1)] (3.2c)
G(t) = R(t) − S (3.2d)
Equation (3.2a) measures the force acting on a power line component, where Q is the air
density factor, Kz is exposure coefficient, Kzt is a topography factor, V is 3-sec gust wind
speed, G the gust response factor of the component, C f the drag coefficient, and A is the
area of the component’s surface normal to the wind direction. Equation (3.2b) measures
the moment of stress on a power pole, where h is the height of the pole above ground.
All other parameters besides design specifications for A and h are normally distributed
stochastic random variables with mean and variance relating to historical data ((Salman
2016)). Equation (3.2c) estimates resistance of a power pole from its material properties
and design specifications, where t is the age of the pole and a1, a2, b1 and b2 are coefficients
found by linear regression from Li et al. (2005). Equation (3.2d) calculates the probability
that the stress of hurricane winds on a power pole will overcome design strength. Standard
values for Kz, G, A, h, C f , and R0 used in this thesis are from Salman (2016) and Creative
Pultrusions (2013). Parameter values for calculating stress-strength response for wooden
and composite poles are listed in Appendix B.1.
To generate fragility curves for power system elements, we use Monte Carlo simulation.
First, the force and the moment are calculated using probabilities for uncertain parameters
given in Salman et al. (2015). We assume that all distribution lines are above ground and
the system only contains transformers that are pole mounted, so all elements have the same
factors for exposure, topography, gust response, drag, and surface area. The probability that
a hurricane has a particular 3-sec gust wind speed is modeled using a normal distribution
for each hurricane wind speed category from Schott et al. (2012) (Figure 3.3). We run
N = 106 simulations to generate stress moments for power poles using Equations (3.2a) and
(3.2b).
Once stress moments are calculated, we determine the strength of various power distri-
bution poles. This is also achieved via Monte Carlo simulation, where parameters for
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Equation (3.2c) are stochastic and normally distributed values from Sadhu and Das (2015)
for wooden poles and from Creative Pultrusions (2013) for composite poles. We assume
the age for wooden power distribution poles is t = 2 years to match the current age of power
poles in STX. We run the simulation to generate N = 106 pole strengths for both wooden
and composite materials.
Wind speed distributions are assumed to be normally distributed within each cat-
egory of hurricane. Hurricane wind speed categories are defined in Schott et al.
(2012). Created by author with RStudio on November 19, 2019 (RStudio Team
2015)
.
Figure 3.3. Distribution of wind speeds for each hurricane category.
Together, the stress-strength failure probability for wooden and composite power poles
for different hurricane wind speeds are presented in Figure 3.4. Both fragility curves for
wooden power poles (blue line) and composite power poles (red line) follow a logarithmic
normal distribution. Each line is an average over Monte Carlo simulation runs as the sum of
power pole failures divided by the number of simulations (Salman et al. 2015). On average,
STX wooden power poles are much more vulnerable to hurricane winds. Composite poles
show a low probability of failure up to wind speeds of 180 mph.
With the help of fragility curves in Figure 3.4, we generate hurricane failure scenarios for
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the STX EPDS. We use similar Monte Carlo methods to generate scenarios as did Kotz
and Pensky (2003). First, we generate 20 storms for each hurricane category using the
normal distributions presented in Figure 3.3 to measure hurricane stress. Then, we assume
two different scenarios for each power pole on each feeder line to determine infrastructure
strength— one where the pole is wooden and one where the pole is composite material. For
each scenario for each wind speed category, we measure stress versus strength to determine
whether the pole fails. We assume wooden poles fail with the probability presented in
Figure 3.4 (blue line). We assume composite poles fail with the probability presented in
Figure 3.4 (red line) if in non-forested areas, and with probability of wooden poles (blue
line) if located in forested areas, due to possible tree strikes. In other words, we assume
composite poles in forested areas perform the same as wooden poles. See methods in
Section 3.1.4 for more details on the difference between forest and non-forest areas. We
also assume transformers and power lines are pole mounted and fail at the same time as
power poles.
Fragility curves for wood poles (blue) and composite poles (red) for different wind 
speeds. Created by author with RStudio on November 19, 2019 (RStudio Team 
2015)
Figure 3.4. Fragility curves of utility poles.
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3.1.3 STX Operator Model to Measure Hurricane Impacts
We compute power flow in the STX EPDS using an ACOPF model. Our operator model
is based on the work of Petri (2017), where the author developed a model formulation
and a Python-based implementation in Pyomo (Hart et al. 2017). The operator model is a
prescriptive optimizationmodel that solves for the set of feasible power flows that minimizes
the amount of load shed that the operator has to impose on customers. This ACOPF model
is used by several authors to study disaster impacts on power distribution systems (Barnes
et al. 2017; Mashayekh et al. 2017; Lipka et al. 2013; Nagarajan et al. 2016; Cain et al.
2012).
We implemented the same model as Petri (2017) with a few modifications for studying
hurricane impacts.
Sets and Indices
i ∈ N set of nodes (buses) in Power Grid (PG) (alias j)
E ⊆ N ×N set of undirected edges (lines and transformers) in PG
NT ⊆ E set of edges without transformers in PG
S ⊆ NT set of edges with switches in PG
A ⊆ N ×N set of directed arcs (lines and transformers) in PG
(i, j) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (i, j) ∈ E ∧ ( j, i) ∈ E
P = {a, b, c} set of phases in PG
k ∈ Pi ⊆ P set of phases on bus i which contains a load or a generator
Pi j ⊆ P set of phases on line (i, j) in PG
C set of cycles in PG
N(C) set of nodes in cycle C
E(C) set of edges in cycle C
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Parameters [units]
λpi,k cost for shedding real power at bus i on phase k [$/kW]
λqi,k cost for shedding reactive power at bus i on phase k [$/kVar]
Ti j,k thermal limit on edge (i, j) for phase k [Amps]
v li,k, v
u
i,k voltage lower and upper bounds at bus i for phase k [Kv]
i imaginary number constant
dpi,k + i dqi,k AC power demand at bus i on phase k [Kw and Kvar]
gpui,k + i gq
u
i,k existing AC power generation capacity at bus i on phase k [Kw and Kvar]
Ri j,k + i Xi j,k impedance of edge (i, j) on phase k in PG [Ω]
Zi j impedance of edge (i, j), defined as:
Z i j = Zi jei2π/3; Z i j = Zi je
−i2π/3,where, Z i j = Ri j + iX i j, Z i j = Ri j + iX i j [Ω]
Mi j Mi j = (1.05Vnomj )
2 − (0.95Vnomi )
2 ∀i j ∈ E [Volts2]
βi j allowed variation in flow between phases on edge (i, j)
[0.15 for transformer edges, 1.0 for all other edges]
zi j is set to 0 if an element / arc (i, j) is destroyed in PG [binary]
Vnomi nominal voltage the system is operating at [Kv]
Vmini factor for minimal voltage the system is operating at
Vmaxi factor for maximum the system is operating at
Decision Variables
vi,k voltage at bus i on phase k [Kv]
xi j determines if directed arc (i, j) carries power flow in PG [binary]
pi j,k real AC power flow on arc (i, j) [Kw]
qi j,k reactive AC power flow on arc (i, j) [Kvar]
lpi,k + i lqi,k AC power load that is shed at bus i on phase k [Kw] and [Kvar]





(λpi,k lpi,k + λqi,k lqi,k) (M1)
s.t.
Power flow constraints






p ji,k ∀i ∈ A, k ∈ Pi (M2a)






q ji,k ∀i ∈ A, k ∈ Pi (M2b)
(1 − βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j pi j,k
|Pi j |
)
≤ pi j,k ≤ (1 + βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j pi j,k
|Pi j |
)
∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (M3a)
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(1 − βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j qi j,k
|Pi j |
)
≤ qi j,k ≤ (1 + βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j qi j,k
|Pi j |
)
∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (M3b)
pi j,k ≥ −zi j xi jTi j,kVnomi 3
1
4 ∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (M4a)
pi j,k ≤ zi j xi jTi j,kVnomi 3
1
4 ∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (M4b)
qi j,k ≥ −zi j xi jTi j,kVnomi 3
1
4 ∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (M4c)
qi j,k ≤ zi j xi jTi j,kVnomi 3
1
4 ∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (M4d)
pi j,k + qi j,k ≤ zi j xi jTi j,kVnomi
√
6 ∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (M4e)
(v j,a)
2 − (vi,a)
2 + 2(Raai j pi j,a + X
aa
i j qi j,a + R
ab
i j pi j,b + X
ab
i j qi j,b + R
ac
i j pi j,c + X
ac
i j qi j,c)
≥ −Mi j(1 − zi j xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (M5a)
(v j,b)
2 − (vi,b)
2 + 2(Rbbi j pi j,b + X
bb
i j qi j,b + R
bc
i j pi j,c + X
bc
i j qi j,c + R
ba
i j pi j,a + X
ba
i j qi j,a)
≥ −Mi j(1 − zi j xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (M5b)
(v j,c)
2 − (vi,c)
2 + 2(Rcci j pi j,c + X
cc
i j qi j,c + R
ca
i j pi j,a + X
ca
i j qi j,a + R
cb
i j pi j,b + X
cb
i j qi j,b)
≥ −Mi j(1 − zi j xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (M5c)
(v j,a)
2 − (vi,a)
2 + 2(Raai j pi j,a + X
aa
i j qi j,a + R
ab
i j pi j,b + X
ab
i j qi j,b + R
ac
i j pi j,c + X
ac
i j qi j,c)
≤ Mi j(1 − zi j xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (M5d)
(v j,b)
2 − (vi,b)
2 + 2(Rbbi j pi j,b + X
bb
i j qi j,b + R
bc
i j pi j,c + X
bc
i j qi j,c + R
ba
i j pi j,a + X
ba
i j qi j,a)
≤ Mi j(1 − zi j xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (M5e)
(v j,c)
2 − (vi,c)
2 + 2(Rcci j pi j,c + X
cc
i j qi j,c + R
ca
i j pi j,a + X
ca
i j qi j,a + R
cb
i j pi j,b + X
cb
i j qi j,b)









2 ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (M6)
0 ≤ gpi,k ≤ gpui,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (M7a)
gqi,k ≤ gqui,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (M7b)
− gqi,k ≤ gqui,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (M7c)
lpi,k ≤ dpi,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (M8a)
lqi,k ≤ dqi,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (M8b)
zi j xi j + z ji x ji ≤ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E (M10a)
zi j xi j + zi j x ji ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E \ S (M10b)
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Equation (M1) is the objective function of the model that minimizes the cost of real or
reactive load shed at EPDS bus i. We use the cost parameter λ = 1, but it can be set to
various values to prioritize critical loads (Banerjee et al. 2018).
Constraints (M2a) and (M2b) balance load shed, demand, and generation with flow in and
out of each node i. Constraints (M3a) and (M3b) guarantee that the balance between the
flow in each phase k on arc (i, j) is in the right tolerance in terms of electric power physics.
β is a factor that governs tolerances.
Constraints (M4a) through (M4d) are the linear approximations of the original formulation






2√3. Constraint (M4e) is the linear thermal limit of the original model
formulation from Petri (2017). For the approximation, we use the fact that the original
equation is a geometric circle which is quadratic and non-linear. Like Barnes et al. (2017),
we approximate the circle with straight lines, and use only four lines to approximate the
circle as a square. Using this method, we introduce error into final power flow values.
Nonetheless, these errors are small relative to real flows (Barnes et al. 2017).
The next five constraints, M5a through M5f, compute the line losses due to the reactance
and resistance of each line (i, j) for each phase k.
Equation (M6) ensures that the voltage at node i is within tolerances. In a normal operating
EPDS these tolerances are between 95% and 105% of the nominal voltage. For the STX
EPDS we use different values (Appendix B.2), because it is old fashioned and has a bad
design.
Constraints (M7a) through (M8b) set physical bounds for load shed, demand, and generation
at each node i.
The topology constraints (M10a) and (M10b) ensure that there is power flow in only one
direction and that lines without switches are active in at least one direction.
As an extension to the original model from Bunn (2018), we implement an additional binary
variable zi j which is always multiplied with xi j to control broken and functioning power
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lines, transformers, or other elements treated as arcs in the model (Petri 2017).
The data for the STX EPDS system was provided by VIWAPA and Sandia National Labs
(Lave 2019). SNL received data sets from VIWAPA and used OpenDSS (Electric Power
Research Institute 2019) to analyze the STX EPDS. Once SNL verified each EPDS model
worked, it shared the data with NPS. The SNL data needed to be merged by phases of lines
and loads to reduce the number of arcs and nodes in the simulation model. This additional
work reduced the computational complexity and was completed by the author with RStudio
(RStudio Team 2015). The final data set consisted of Comma Separated Value (csv) files
parsed directly to Python and Pyomo (Python Development Team 2019; Hart et al. 2017)
as input for the ACOPF model.
Table 3.2 shows the final number of elements in the STX EPDS system to run the ACOPF
model for each feeder power line. Each feeder model is implemented in Pyomo and power
flow is solved using the CPLEX solver (CPLEX 2009). We run the ACOPF model for each
feeder line independently and in parallel to reduce the computational complexity. Feeder
line 04a is not analyzed because data was unavailable at the time of analysis.
Table 3.2. Components in the STX EPDS
Feeder XFMRs Loads Power Lines
01a 98 237 1284
02a 684 2366 5012
03a 313 1371 3268
04a – – –
05a 280 2169 3559
06a 597 1964 5343
06b 50 146 515
08b 912 5174 11433
09b 497 1876 6382
10b 368 1724 3561
Sum 3799 17027 40357
Number of elements for each feeder power line in the ACOPF model for the STX
EPDS. Note: Data for Feeder 04a was unavailable during the completion of this
work and is omitted in the results and analysis. Adapted from Lave (2019).
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Figure 3.5 presents the initial model verification to ensure that the STX EPDS operator
model functions as intended. We first run a simulation without any failed components
and receive a result in which there is no shed load (total demand served = 32710.18 kW ,
objective value = $120.02). The objective function (M1) is the product of a cost parameter
λwith real and reactive power. For that reason the objective function has the unit $. Because
we use λp = 1 $/kW and λq = 1 $/kVar for real and reactive power the objective function
can be seen as the sum of real and reactive power. In an optimal working system, one would
assume to have an objective value = $0, i.e., no load shed. This does not occur in the
STX EPDS because we use real data of an old system that currently has several overloaded
power lines serving customers. It is not possible to serve all the loads in the ACOPF model
without changing physical characteristics. Still, the total error is only 0.4 % of demand
served, which is negligible with respect to load shed during real disasters.
We run a second simulation in which a single element failed on Feeder 06a. Feeder 06a is
radial in structure, and the failed segment is in themiddle of the line (resulting in an objective
value = $289.52). The model works as expected, and all loads from Midland substation
down line from the failed line segment are shed (resulting in total load shed = 169.5 kW).
The area without electric power is circled (Figure 3.5).
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Top: when there are no failed components in the STX EPDS, all feeder power lines 
serve all loads. Loads served without load shed are colored in blue. Bottom: A line 
failure at pole ’oh219624’ impacts flow for Feeder 06a, but no other feeder power 
lines. All the loads connected further from the Midland substation than the failed 
component are without electric power (red). The location of the failure is marked 
with an arrow and the area without electric power is circled. All other loads on 
all other feeders remain blue. Created with RStudio and leaflet on November 28, 
2019 (RStudio Team 2015; Graul 2016).
Figure 3.5. STX EPDS ACOPF Model Verification.
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3.1.4 Hardening the USVI Electric Power Distribution System to Hur-
ricane Disasters
The combination of hurricane impact methods (Section 3.1.2) and ACOPF methods (Sec-
tion 3.1.3) provides a basis to measure the benefits of different system hardening to protect
the STX EPDS from hurricanes. We implement the stochastic stress-strain simulation
methods to determine which parts of the STX EPDS will fail during hurricanes with and
without infrastructure hardening. Specifically, we compare different types of utility poles
and power line undergrounding and measure their impacts on load shed. We define four
different system designs with different failure probabilities.
• Scenario 1: The entire STX EPDS uses wooden power poles.
• Scenario 2: The entire STX EPDS uses composite power poles.
• Scenario 3: High-voltage portions of the STX EPDS are buried underground.
• Scenario 4: The STX EPDS uses a combination of burying high-voltage portions of
feeder power lines and using composite poles.
These scenarios are chosen based on the feasibility of each hardening method. Scenario
1 does not include any system hardening and represents the current STX EPDS. Scenario
2 assumes that all power poles can be hardened to composite materials. Scenario 3 as-
sumes that all non-customer power lines can be buried at a reasonable cost to protect the
system. The voltage levels for non-customer power lines for each feeder are defined in
Table 3.3. Scenario 4 uses an optimal, combined approach for both burying lines and
installing composite poles.
Each scenario has a unique combination of failure probabilities based on methods presented
in Section 3.1.2. In Scenario 1, all power poles are assumed to fail with wooden power
pole probability defined in Figure 3.4 (blue line). Transformers and other power system
equipment are assumed to be attached to power poles and fail when a pole fails.
Scenario 2 uses a combination of composite pole failure probabilities (Figure 3.4, red line)
and wooden pole vulnerabilities. Although composite poles are hardened to wind, they are
still vulnerable to debris strikes. In particular, trees can still be removed from the ground
with the same probability as a wooden power pole and cause nearby composite poles to fail.
This was recently experienced when a composite pole failed on St. John during a Category-1
hurricane (Kossler 2019; Kostecke and Fisk 2019). Thus, composite poles located in or
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Table 3.3. Voltage levels per feeder.
Feeder Customer [kV] Distribution 1 [kV] Distribution 2 [kV] Substation
01a 0.12 8 9.2 Richmond
02a 0.12 8 19.9 Richmond
03a 0.12 8 – Richmond
05a 0.12 8 – Richmond
06a 0.12 8 19.9 Richmond
06b 0.12 14.4 – Midland
08b 0.12 14.4 – Midland
09b 0.12 14.4 – Midland
10b 0.12 14.4 – Midland
The customer voltage level for both substations is 120 V; the distribution voltage 
level for Richmond substation is 8 kV and for Midland 14.4 kV. Additionally, some 
feeders of Richmond substation have another voltage level with 9.2 kV or 19.9 kV.
near forested areas are as fragile as wooden power poles.
To model the different vulnerabilities of composite poles, we determined whether each
power pole is in a forested area or in an urban or suburban area on STX (Figure 3.6).
This was achieved using raster data for USVI land use cover from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2012). We interpolated the geospatial coordinates of
STX EPDS power poles and forested areas to determine which infrastructure is surrounded
by trees and has a high risk for tree strikes. Figure 3.7 showswhich poles were determined to
be surrounded by trees (red) and are assumed to fail with the same probability as a wooden
power pole.
In Scenario 3, the STX EPDS is buried underground based on cost effective strategies that
VIWAPA might employ. Although underground systems have much lower probability of
failure than above-ground systems (average probability p = 0.26, from fragility curves), it
is cost prohibitive to put all components of the STX EPDS underground. Specifically, it is
expensive to bury all low-voltage power lines and transformers that serve customers at the
end of feeder power lines. Thus, we assume that the high-voltage “trunk” of each feeder
power line can be buried, but infrastructure at customer voltage levels cannot (Table 3.3).
The percentage of underground power lines modeled in Scenario 3 is presented in Table 3.4.
For Scenario 4, we combine the use of composite poles and buried power lines where most
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Feeder of Midland or Richmond substation on STX to determine whether mainly 
in forested or in urban / sub-urban areas. Green shaded areas are forested ar-
eas. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2012). 
Created with RStudio on November 19, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015; Graul 2016).
Figure 3.6. STX Forest and Feeders.
Green shaded areas are forested areas. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) (2012). The power distribution poles are colored red 
when they are in a forested area and black otherwise. Created with RStudio on 
November 19, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015; Graul 2016).
Figure 3.7. Poles and forested areas STX.
appropriate for optimal hardening. Specifically, infrastructure far from forested areas and
near customer voltage levels are given composite poles that protect transformers and lines
from hurricane winds. The primary “trunk” portion of feeder power lines are buried to
ensure that higher voltage lines survive the storms.
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Table 3.4. Underground power lines
Feeder Underground [mi] Above Ground [mi] Percent Underground
01a 7.9 20.7 38.1 %
02a 73.7 127.8 57.6 %
03a 38.4 80.1 47.9 %
05a 32.8 72.6 45.2 %
06a 64.3 120.0 53.5%
06b 8.8 14.1 62.3 %
08b 106.4 250.4 42.5 %
09b 56.3 135.5 41.6 %
10b 48.0 86.5 55.5 %
Percentage of underground power lines vs. all power lines.
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3.2 RQ2: Vulnerability Analysis of the St. Croix Water
Distribution System to Hurricane Disasters
Similar to other WDS in the United States, the basic elements of the STX WDS include
sources of fresh water, pumping stations to move water, pipes to distribute water, tanks for
water storage and to maintain system pressure, valves to control water flow and pressure,
and junctions to access and consumer water and point-of-use. The general structure of
the STX WDS, including water production and treatment, pump stations, tanks, pipes, and
demands are presented in Figure 3.8.
3.2.1 The STX Water Distribution System
EPANET overview of the Water Distribution System on STX with junctions, pump 
stations, tanks and the reservoir Seven Seas in Frederikstedt. Created by the author 
with RStudio on October 30, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 3.8. Water Distribution System St. Croix.
It is important to note that unlike most regions in the United States, not all communities
on STX have access to the VIWAPA water system. Specifically, outlying customers in the
North-West and in the East are not connected to the STX WDS. These customers instead
rely on cisterns for water access and get their water either by water truck delivery, rainwater
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catchment, or a combination of both.
The STX WDS has three pump stations (Table 3.5) and six storage tanks to maintain water
pressure (Table 3.6). The three pump stations are Richmond, Concordia, and Contentment
which have four, two, and three pumps, respectively. All pumps in Concordia and Con-
tentment are the same and are manufactured by Gould Pumps (ITT Goulds Pumps 2017).
Richmond has similar pumps from a different manufacturer. Each pump station operates
differently depending on customer needs. The Richmond pump station operates all four
pumps continuously at all times. This means there is no backup pump during an individual
pump failure. Concordia and Contentment each operate with one pump acting as a backup
spare.
Table 3.5. Pump stations of STX
Station Number of Pumps Type
Richmond 4 Head
Contentment 2 (1 spare) Head
Concordia 2 (1 spare) Head
Table 3.6. Storage tanks of STX
Tank Max. Level [ft] Diameter [ft] Volume [Mgal]
Richmond 48.2 192.2 10.4
Recovery Hill 36.0 68.76 1
Monbijou 33.0 101.57 2
Kingshill 47.0 134.57 5
Grove Place 10.0 41.26 0.1
Annas-Hope 10.0 41.26 0.1
Pump stations are operated to fill the six STX water tanks and maintain pressure across
the WDS (Table 3.6). Of the six water tanks, Richmond and Kingshill are the two most
critical for WDS operations. In general, these tanks are not maintained at their full capacity
to ensure that water is constantly moving and water quality does not deteriorate (e.g., see
Figure 3.9 for the actual water levels of Kingshill tank during the month of August 2019).
However, if Richmond or Kingshill tank does not have enough water, the WDS system will
not be able to serve STX communities. Richmond tank is the initial storage tank from the
Seven Seas Water production facility. Thus, if Richmond tank drains, then the rest of the
WDS loses its water source. Similarly, Kingshill tank is located in the center of STX, and
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all communities west of Kingshill receive their water from the tank via gravity-driven flow.
Thus, if Kingshill tank empties, then the entire city of Frederiksted will lose access to water.
Figure 3.9. Tank Level Kingshill August 2019.
The real tank level of Kingshill storage tank on STX in August 2019 (blue line)
and maximum tank level (red line). Adapted from Simmons (2019a), created with
RStudio on November 29, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
To deliver water from the pump stations to tanks and customers, the STXWDS is connected
by underground pipelines. All pipes are assumed to be ductile iron and range in diameter
from 16 inches for large-distance transmission to 4 inches near customer use. Overall, there
are 137.5 miles of pipeline modeled in the STX WDS.
At the end of each pipe, there are three primary types of VIWAPA customers: residential,
commercial, and industrial. Each customer type has a unique water use pattern throughout
a day (Simmons 2019b). We model each demand pattern for each customer type based on
common demand patterns found in the literature (Kang and Lansey 2009). The average
demand pattern for each customer type is shown in Figure 3.10.
Customer demand is aggregated at each WDS junction based on geolocation and demand
type. To determine how many customers of each type and the total quantity of demand
each customer places on the STX WDS (in gallons per minute), we used a combination
of raw demand data and a geocoding algorithm. Specifically, demand data provided by
VIWAPA we organize by household type and address. We use a geocoding algorithm to
convert addresses into coordinates and assigned each customer coordinate to its nearest
WDS junction. Figure 3.11 presents the percentage of each demand across WDS junctions.
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Demand patterns of the different kinds of customers used in the simulation: (1)
commercial (blue), (2) residential (red), and (3) industrial (green). The demand
multipliers are used to determine water demands in gal/min by setting the area
under the demand curve equal to the average daily demand for each customer
in the VIWAPA system. Created with RStudio on November 26, 2019 (RStudio
Team 2015). Source: Kang and Lansey (2009).
Figure 3.10. Demand Multipliers for Three Primary Water Customer Desig-
nations on STX.
Demand data was provided by VIWAPA to determine individual customers demand rates
(gallons per minute) across an average 24-hour day on STX. The daily water use for a given
customer we calculate by dividing the demand measured by VIWAPA by the number of
days between water meter readings. Then, daily use we aggregate by customer type and an
average (i.e., mean) daily use was calculated for each customer type. The average daily use
we convert into demand rates (gal/min) by setting the area under the demand multipliers
in Figure 3.10 equal to the average daily demand. Each customer of a particular type is
assumed to have the same daily demand.
3.2.2 Hurricane Impacts on the STX Water Distribution System
The focus of this thesis are the interdependencies of the STX EPDS and WDS. Thus,
hurricane impacts are assumed to cause power outages. Although WDS are also vulnerable
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Percentage of customers for each STX WDS junction. Customers are labelled by
color (1) Commercial (red), (2) Residential (green), and (3) Industrial (blue). The
majority of junctions with demand have a combination of residential and com-
mercial water customers. Created with RStudio on November 26, 2019 (RStudio
Team 2015). Source: Kang and Lansey (2009).
Figure 3.11. Percentage for Three Primary Water Customer Designations
per Junction on STX.
to other failures, such as leaks and water quality issues, the biggest problem experienced
in the USVI after hurricanes Irma and Maria was the loss of electricity to pump water.
Thus, we focus the scenarios for hurricane disasters for the STX WDS on pump station
power outages. Specifically, we consider eight outage scenarios, one for each combination
of the Richmond, Concordia, and Contentment pump stations operating and non-operating.
Table 3.7 presents which station is considered working or non-functional for each scenario.
During analysis of simulation runs, all blackouts are assumed to occur after 92 hours of
normal system operation.
3.2.3 Operator Model for the STX Water Distribution System
We use the Python programming-based package Water Network Tool for Resilience
(WNTR) to develop an STX WDS operator model (Klise et al. 2018, 2017). WNTR has
access to both hydraulic balancing simulation methods described in Section 2.3.3: Demand
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Table 3.7. Pumping station blackout scenarios
Pump Station S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
Richmond X X X X
Concordia X X X X
Contentment X X X X
An X indicates that the station is non-functional for the given scenario. Blackouts
are programmed to occur simultaneously after 92 hours of system operation.
Driven Flow and Pressure Driven Demand. To complete an extended-period simulation for
hydraulic balancing, both DDF and PDD use the mass balance equations from EPANET
(Klise et al. 2017):
∑
jεPn
q j,n − Dactn = 0 ∀nεN (3.4)
In Equation (3.4), j are junctions, n are nodes, and Pn and N are their sets, q j,n is the flow
rate of water from junction j into node n and Dactn is the actual demand at node n.
Furthermore, both DDF and PDD use the Hazen-Williams equation to determine hydraulic
pressures through the pipeline system (Klise et al. 2017):
Hnj − Hni = hL = 10.667C
−1.852d−4.871Lq1.852 for q < 0 (3.5a)
Hnj − Hni = hL = −10.667C
−1.852d−4.871Lq1.852 for q > 0 (3.5b)
where Hnj and Hni are the pressure head at starting and ending node, hL is the headloss in
the pipe, C is the Hazen-Williams roughness coefficient of the pipe, L is pipe length, d is
pipe diameter, and q is the flow rate in the pipe estimated with Equation (3.4) (Williams
and Hazen 1908). Regarding this equation there is a positive flow rate if water flows from
start to end node and a negative flow rate for the opposite direction.
To simulate water availability during disasters, we use the PDD hydraulic balancingmethod.
PDD differs from DDF because it assumes that demand is not necessarily met for all
junctions, and losses in pressure and flow curtail demand. For this WNTR uses the
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following built-in pressure-demand relationship (Klise et al. 2017):
Dact =

0 for p ≤ P0
D f (
p − p0
P f − P0
)
1
2 for P0 ≤ p ≤ P f
D f for p ≥ P f
(3.6a)
where P0 and P f are the pressure thresholds at which customers either get no water or do
not get the desired amount of water, respectively; Dact is the actual demand, D f the desired
demand, and p is the pressure.
UsingWNTR, we construct a STXWDS operator model that determines pipeline pressures,
pump operations, and tank levels to deliver water to VIWAPA customers (Table 3.8). This
model has seven pumps, six tanks, 847 pipes, 670 junctions, and 199 water consumers.
Table 3.8. STX water operator model elements
Pumps Tanks Junctions Pipes Demand Nodes
7 6 670 847 199
Number of elements in the WNTR model. Note: Pressure Reducing Valves (PRV)
are not included in the current version of the STX WDS operator model.
To verify whether the model produces realistic results, we ran verification simulation runs
under normal operating conditions. In Figure 3.12 junctions J-472 and J-093 are shown in
the STX WDS marked with arrows. In Figure 3.13, we show the demand and water served
at these junctions from different parts of the island. This example shows the demand and
pressure over a time period of 48 hours. To achieve a steady state with these conditions for
hurricane vulnerability analysis, we run each scenario in Table 3.7 for a simulated period
of 48 hours to hot-start the system at high pressure. Note that the current operator model
produces pressures much higher than normally needed to deliver water (e.g., pressure ≥ 400
at Demand Node J-472). This occurs because we assume pumps are running to fill water
tanks and maximize water storage prior to a hurricane.
Figure 3.13 also shows the daily pattern of demand as described earlier (3.10) and the
differences in the pattern dependent of the types of customers connected.
Figure 3.12 verifies that there are different zones of pressure across the island. Important
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The pressure at all junctions on STX at 09:00am (top) and at 00:00 am (bottom). 
Pressure zones form in the Eastern, Central, and Western portions of STX. We 
highlight Junctions J-093 and J-472 shown in Figure 3.13 to indicate their locations 
in Christansted and Frederiksted, respectively. The pressure difference between 
Christansted (East) and Frederiksted (West) is nearly 200 psi during times of low 
demand (Hour 00:00). Created with RStudio on November 29, 2019 (RStudio 
Team 2015).
Figure 3.12. Pressure Across STX WDS during Steady State Operations.
zones include Christiansted and Frederiksted, as they receive water via different means
(pump driven vs. gravity driven, respectively) from different primary tanks (Richmond
vs. Kingshill, respectively).
3.3 RQ3: Interdependent Vulnerability of the St. Croix
Electric Power and Water Distribution Systems
We combine methods and results for independent EPDS and WDS systems to analyze the
interdependent vulnerability of power and water infrastructure on STX. Specifically, we
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The demand (blue) and pressure (orange) over a time period of 48 hours at junc-
tions J-472 and J-093 (see Figure 3.12). Created by the author with RStudio on
November 29, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 3.13. Demand and pressure at two junctions in the STX WDS Op-
erator Model.
measure how frequently hurricane disaster blackouts from the EPDS operator model lead
to loss of electricity at Richmond, Concordia, and Contentment pump stations. Figure 3.14
shows STXEPDS feeder regions that deliver electricity to the STXWDSpump stations. The
Richmond pump station is co-located with the Richmond substation and receives electricity
from a short-distance, underground power line. In contrast, Contentment and Concordia
pump stations are connected to above-ground feeders. Specifically, Contentment receives
electricity from Feeder 02a and Concordia from Feeder 06b.
We study impacts of blackouts of Feeder 02a and 06b on Contentment and Concordia pump
stations to make recommendations for how to harden the STX EPDS to maintain water
services. Because Richmond pump station relies on a short, underground power line, we
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Location of STX WDS pump stations with respect to STX EPDS feeder power 
lines. Blue Markers are the three STX pump stations. The shaded areas are the 
region that each nearby feeder power line serves. Based on maps and analysis, 
Concordia pump station is connected to Feeder 06b, Contentment to Feeder 02a, 
and Richmond pump station to the Richmond substation via underground power 
line. Created with RStudio on November 26, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 3.14. Location of STX electric power infrastructure serving water 
pump stations.
consider it is already hardened to hurricanes. We focus our analysis on measuring the
frequency with which a hurricane induced blackout on Feeders 02a and 06b affect pump
station operations. This additional analysis requires more hurricane simulations to achieve
a statistically reliable result. We create an additional 30 hurricane scenarios using Monte
Carlo methods described in Section 3.1.2 for Category-2 hurricanes. This produces a total
of 50 hurricane simulations for Feeder 02a and Feeder 06b to determine how often optimal
load shed affects pumping stations.
Using the methods described in 3, we build all necessary models and simulations and run
model verification to ensure they are working correctly. We then study the vulnerability
of the independent and interdependent STX EPDS and WDS. All results are presented in




This chapter presents results for the analysis of hurricane disaster impacts on the STX EPDS
and WDS. The four key results presented in this chapter are:
1. The expected impacts on electric power delivery when the STX EPDS experiences
hurricane disasters (Section 4.1.1);
2. The expected benefits of hurricane hardening methods for the STX EPDS (Section
4.1.2);
3. The expected impacts on water delivery when STX WDS pumping stations fail due
to hurricane blackouts (Section 4.2); and,
4. The likelihood that a hurricane induced blackout will impact STX pumping stations
(Section 4.3).
Results and recommendations presented herein are based on more than 2000 simulations
and optimization model runs. Time to solve a single model realization varied based on
hurricane impacts and EPDS and WDS model elements. We detail the computational
environment for each experiment below, however, in general the solve time ranged from
less than one second for small models to 30 hours for the most complex. Overall, results
requiredmore than 240,000GB ofmemory and the usage of about 24,000 central processing
units (CPU) to complete.
4.1 RQ1: Vulnerability Analysis of the St. Croix Electric
Power Distribution System to Hurricane Disasters
4.1.1 Expected Load Shed of the St. Croix Electric Power Distribution
System to Hurricanes
We measure the expected loss of load in the STX EPDS due to infrastructure failures
caused by hurricane disasters. The results for all 20 simulation runs for each category of
hurricane are presented in Figure 4.1. Results are presented as a load shed ratio that has
values from 0 to 1, where 0 means no customers on the feeder lose electricity and 1 means
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Fraction of electric load shed by each feeder under simulated hurricanes of in-
creasing intensity. For each category, we simulate 20 hurricanes, and report the
distribution of load shed ratios for each feeder. The boxes in the plots are the
range between lower and upper quartile of values, the line in the middle is the
median and points are outliers. Created by the author with RStudio on November
19, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 4.1. Load shed ratio for wooden utility poles (Scenario 1).
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all customer load is shed. Results presented in Figure 4.1 were generated by solving the
STX EPDS operator model with Hamming (Information Technology and Communications
Services (ITACS) 2019). Hamming is a heterogenous supercomputer owned and run by the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). This computer works with 4282 CPUs and the available
memory is 18.56 tebibytes (TiB) ( 20.4 terabyte (TB)). For each simulation run we allocated
120 gigabyte (GB) of memory and 12 CPUs.
Results in Figure 4.1 show that the expected load shed to each STX feeder power line
increases in an expected way with increasing hurricane wind speed. For Category-1 hur-
ricanes, all feeder power lines operate with significant load shed. Neither Feeder 01a nor
06b experiences any load shed across all 20 scenarios, and the other seven feeders have
small outages on average. On the other hand, Category-3 or greater hurricanes cause near
complete load shed across the entire island. During a Category-5 hurricane like Hurri-
cane Maria, we expect all feeders will experience 100% of customers losing electricity on
average.
Figure 4.1 shows that the robustness of each feeder power line is different for Category-2
hurricanes. Feeders 01a and 05a are far more robust and are expected to shed roughly
25% or fewer customers on average. In contrast, Feeders 02a, 06a, 08b, 09b, and 10b are
expected to shed more than 50% of their load. Feeders 03a and 06b have a large spread
across the 20 hurricane scenarios, and can shed either a low number of customers or many
customers depending on which EPDS elements fail.
Figure 4.1 also shows that storms as low as Category-3 wind speeds will still lead to
Hurricane Maria-sized blackouts. While Category-1 storms result in a probability of failure
nearly 0 (Figure 3.4, blue line) and Category-5 storms result in a probability of failure nearly
1, Category-3 storms have a failure probability within the range of 9% to 45%. Based on
this analysis, this range of failure probabilities for the STX EPDS nearly guarantees to
disconnect enough poles, lines, and transformers to shed load for all customers. However,
the physical impacts of a Category-3 storm are less than a Category-5, implying that it
will be easier to recover from. Of the 42, 440 power poles on STX, fewer poles fail after a
Category-3 hurricane (11, 197 poles on average) than after a Category-5 hurricane (41, 813
poles on average). Thus, even though the extent of the blackout is the same, the time needed
restoring the whole system is less for a Category-3 storm.
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Results for Category-2 and Category-3 hurricanes emphasize the impact of feeder design
and their geographic location on EPDS vulnerability. Specifically, when feeders traverse
above ground for long distances without any redundancies, then the power line will be
vulnerable to pole failures. In these situations, if only one pole breaks in one of the
power line segments near the substation, then all customers down line from the failure will
experience load shed.
For example, Feeder 01a does not have long transportation distances because it serves the
area around Richmond substation. The design of this short-distance feeder is also branched,
making its vulnerability to random pole failures low in comparison to the other feeders
(Figure 4.1). All other Richmond feeders serve much larger geographic regions than Feeder
01a. For example, Feeders 02a, 03a, and 06a serve the suburban and hilly areas east, south,
and northwest of the Richmond substation, respectively. In contrast, Feeder 05a is relatively
robust, yet delivers electric power to the middle of the island over a relatively long distance
from Richmond substation.
The feeders out ofMidland substation have similar vulnerability toRichmond feeders. While
Feeder 09b delivers power to the area around the substation, there are long, vulnerable
regions of the feeder between the estates it serves. Feeders 06b, 08b, and 10b, deliver
electricity over a relatively long distance to areas far from Midland. For example, Feeder
08b serves the city of Frederiksted andmust traverse hilly areas in the northwest corner of the
island. If one pole breaks along Melvin H. Evans Highway (Figure 3.6), then all customers
in Frederiksted and in the northwest corner of the island will experience a blackout. Due
to their length and radial design, feeders like 08b are vulnerable to all storms with wind
speeds above Category-1.
4.1.2 Expected Reduction in Load Shed for STX EPDS Hurricane
Hardening Methods
Figure 4.2 presents results for STX EPDS hardening Scenarios 1-4 for Category-3 hurri-
canes. As described in Section 3.1.4, installing composite poles and burying feeder power
lines still leave parts of the STX EPDS vulnerable to hurricane winds. Thus, the use of
these hardening methods does not guarantee significant reductions in load shed. Results in
Figure 4.2 indicate that both composite poles and burying portions of feeder power lines
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Boxplots with load shed ratio for all feeders on St. Croix after a Category-3 hurri-
cane. Each plot represents a different hardening scenario: Scenario 1 – no change
to the system (top), Scenario 2 – composite poles, Scenario 3 – undergrounding,
Scenario 4 – combined (bottom). Created by author with RStudio on November
19, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 4.2. Load shed for STX EPDS with hardening (Scenarios 1-4).
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underground can reduce load shed for Category-3 hurricanes. Yet, Figure 4.2 also confirms
that each hardening method on its own is insufficient to ensure that STX EPDS customers
will have access to electricity during a hurricane.
The relative effectiveness of upgrading the STX EPDS to composite poles or burying
overhead lines for mitigating hurricane effects depends on the feeder. In general, burying
power lines underground achieves greater reductions in load shed than installing composite
poles. Feeders 02a, 03a, 06a, 06b, 09b, and 10b all have a lower expected load shed when
buried than when using composite poles. This is due to the co-location of these feeders
and forested areas that make composite poles vulnerable to debris strikes. By contrast,
composite poles achieve a greater reduction in expected load shed for Feeders 01a and 05a
then undergrounding. These two feeders are primarily in urban / suburban areas and are
not as vulnerable to debris.
Figure 4.2 also shows a combined approach that uses composite poles and undergrounding
(Scenario 4) can lead to significant reductions in load shed. This approach buries the main
“trunk” portion of each feeder line and uses composite poles for customer voltage-level
equipment. When combining these approaches, the two hardening methods bolster each
other and make an extremely robust system. Overall, the combined method experiences
nearly no load shed for a Category-3 hurricane.
Combining Figure 4.2 with the map of load shed across scenarios (Figure 4.3) indicates that
the choice between composite poles and installing lines underground also depends on STX
EPDS planning and hurricane recovery operations. Figure 4.2 shows significantly less vari-
ance for expected load shed for composite poles than underground power lines. Figure 4.3
shows that this occurs because the vulnerable portions of each feeder using composite poles
are small compared to the length of each line (also see: Figure 3.7). Moreover, certain
regions with composite poles are well-protected, where some communities still receive
electricity in a Category-3 hurricane. In contrast, Figure 4.3 shows that the greater variance
in expected load shed when burying power lines occurs because the probability of failure
for all customers is equal and difficult to predict. This means, in general, composite poles
may be easier to plan for and recover from in a hurricane disaster. Thus, the robustness of
composite poles to wind combined with their inherent vulnerability to debris might make
them more advantageous from an operational perspective.
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Maps showing loads and their load shed ratio after a Category-3 hurricane. Each
map represents a different hardening scenario: Scenario 1 – no change to the
system (top), Scenario 2 – composite poles, Scenario 3 – undergrounding, Scenario
4 – combined (bottom). Created by author with RStudio on November 19, 2019
(RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 4.3. Map of load shed with hardening (Scenarios 1-4).
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Figure 4.3 emphasizes the potential benefits of a combined approach as large portions of
the entire island are able to maintain electricity. Even so, this approach may be the most
expensive and difficult to implement. Final decisions for hurricane hardening must consider
trade-offs between costs and benefits from a stakeholder perspective to determine which
options are best.
4.2 RQ2: Vulnerability Analysis of the St. Croix Water
Distribution System to Hurricane Disasters
We simulate all hurricane blackout scenarios presented in Table 3.7 with the STX WDS
operator model. As described in Chapter 3, these simulations use a 48-hour hot-start prior
to analysis. Blackouts cause pump station outages in all scenarios on Hour 92. We run each
simulation for a 14-day period to represent a multi-week blackout event.
Figure 4.4 presents results for Kingshill tank levels during multiple blackout scenarios.
Kingshill tank is a critical part of the STX WDS. When Kingshill tank level is main-
tained, then pressure is maintained in the central and western portions of the STX WDS.
When Kingshill tank drains below approximately 10 ft, then customers in Frederiksted
lose significant water pressure. Scenario S1 models normal operations and is not shown
because customers do not lose water services. Figure 4.4 shows that customers will not
lose water service during a blackout affecting only Concordia pump station (Scenario S2)
as water levels are maintained at Kingshill. In contrast, results also show that customers
lose water services after several days of blackout at Contentment pump station (Scenario
S3), Richmond pump station (Scenario S4), and combined blackouts with Concordia and
either Richmond or Contentment pump stations (e.g., Scenario S5).
Figure 4.5 maps the impact on STX communities when Kingshill tank drains. Here,
we can see that communities west of Contentment pump station and Kingshill tank have
different water pressure from communities east of Contentment and near Richmond tank.
Specifically, communities west of Contentment lose water pressure by day 6 and will lose
water service by day 13. In contrast, communities near Richmond pump station do not lose
water pressure, and still operate as normal on day 13.
Figure 4.6 presents a worst-case scenario similar to Hurricane Maria where an island-wide
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Kingshill tank level after blackout Scenarios S2 (top) - S5 (bottom). When King-
shill tank drains, western STX (including Frederiksted) loses water services. Sce-
nario S2 does not lead to any water outages. Scenarios S3-S5 lead to water outages
at rates based on pump capacities. The red line indicates when blackouts start.
Created by author with RStudio on November 26, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 4.4. Electricity outage scenarios for STX WDS operator model.
blackout takes Richmond, Concordia, and Contentment pump stations offline (Scenario S8).
Figure 4.6 shows the tank level for all tanks on the island over a period of 14 days. The
design of the STX WDS places the Richmond pump station between Richmond tank —
where all treated Seven Seas Water is stored — and the STX WDS pipeline. This means
if the pump station goes offline, then STX WDS loses its primary source of water and
Richmond tank level does not change. In contrast, all other tanks on the island drain. The
small tanks, Grove Place and Anna’s Hope, drain in less than one day (13 hours and four
hours, respectively). Medium-sized tanks, Recovery Hill and Monbijou, take between one
and two days, and two and three days to drain, respectively. Kingshill tank, being the largest
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Pressure at junctions in STX WDS on days 3, 4, 6, and 13 for Scenario S3 (power
outage at Contentment pump station). Christiansted and nearby communities east
of Contentment maintain water pressure, while Central and Western communities
do not. Created by author with RStudio on November 26, 2019 (RStudio Team
2015).
Figure 4.5. STX WDS pressure for Scenario S3.
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Tank levels on STX with a power outage at all pump stations (Scenario S8) after 92
hours (red line). Each tank drains with different rates depending on size, location,
and demands. Water services across the entire island are lost once Kingshill tank
drains. Created by author with RStudio on November 26, 2019 (RStudio Team
2015).
Figure 4.6. STX WDS tank levels for Scenario S8.
besides Richmond, takes five to six days to drain completely.
Figure 4.7 shows how the impact of island-wide blackouts leads to different communities
losing water services in contrast to a single pump station failure. After loss of all pump
stations, Christiansted will lose water services after six days, while Frederiksted still main-
tains enough pressure. This is in contrast to Scenario S3 (Figure 4.5), where Christiansted
maintained pressure even after 13 days of blackout. This discrepancy is due to the size and
importance of Kingshill tank. While Christiansted communities do not have large storage
tanks to back up Richmond, Kingshill maintains pressure for central and western STX
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Pressure at junctions in STX WDS on days 3, 4, 6, and 13 with a island-wide
blackout (Scenario S8). Christiansted loses water pressure and water services by
day 6. Kingshill tank maintains pressure in the western portions of STX. The
entire island loses water services by day 13. Created by author with RStudio on
November 26, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 4.7. STX WDS pressure for Scenario S8.
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communities for several days after blackouts.
4.3 RQ3: Interdependent Vulnerability Analysis of the
St. Croix Electric Power and Water Distribution Sys-
tems
Boxplots with 50 different scenarios of Feeder 02a and 06b under circumstances
of Category-2 hurricane. Concordia pump station is served with electric power by
Feeder 06b and Contentment by Feeder 02a. Created by author with RStudio on
November 26, 2019 (RStudio Team 2015).
Figure 4.8. Boxplots Feeder 02a and 06b Category-2 Hurricane.
Figure 4.8 compares the expected load shed of feeder power lines serving STX WDS
pump stations in Category-2 hurricanes. Feeder 02a serves Contentment pump station and
Feeder 06b serves Concordia. Boxplots in Figure 4.8 are produced with 50 simulations to
achieve more statistically significant results and improve comparison across power lines.
Results show that both Feeders 02a and 06b experience significant load shed for Category-2
hurricanes. However, Feeder 02a has 91% load shed on average, while Feeder 06b is slightly
more robust with 81% load shed on average. Due to similar vulnerability, it is not possible
to determine which feeder is more important to harden for the STX WDS from the optimal
load shed ratios in Figure 4.8. Instead, we measure the frequency with which Contentment
and Concordia pump stations are part of the load shed on each feeder power line (Table 4.1)
Results show that both pump stations have probability of failure ≥ 50% in a Category-2
hurricane. In particular, Concordia pump station is more vulnerable, and is included in 92%
of all power line blackouts on Feeder 06b. This is because Feeder 06b is a long power line
surrounded by forested area. Contentment pump station is in a much more urban portion
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of the island and closer to Richmond substation. Thus, there are fewer EPDS elements that
can fail and cause Contentment to lose electricity.
Table 4.1. Blackout frequency for STX pump stations
# Scenarios # Pump Station Blackout Freq.
02a 50 35 0.7
06b 50 46 0.92
Frequency that a Category-2 hurricane induced blackouts on Feeder 02a and 06b
lead to loss of electricity at STX WDS pump stations. Feeder 02a serves Content-
ment pump station and Feeder 06b serves Concordia pump station.
Overall, the combination of independent and interdependent vulnerability analyses for the
STX EPDS and WDS provide a basis for making recommendations to protect both systems
from future hurricanes. We integrate results for hurricane induced blackouts, power system
hardening, optimal water system operations, and water system protection in Chapter 5 into





The purpose of work presented in this thesis is to support USVI communities on the island
of St. Croix. Hurricanes Irma and Maria revealed the vulnerability of USVI electric power
and water distribution systems to hurricane disasters. The models, methods, scenarios, and
results presented in this thesis support current decision-making to harden system to future
crises. We are confident that efforts to implement recommendations made in this thesis will
help protect future USVI communities from experiencing the same devastation they faced
in 2017. Moreover, efforts to advance the work from this thesis to STT/STJ islands and
other U.S. communities may reduce the impacts of future disasters across the nation.
5.1 Vulnerability and Hardening of the United States Vir-
gin Islands Electric Power Distribution System to Hur-
ricanes
The current EPDS on STX uses wooden power poles, which makes the system very vulnera-
ble to hurricane wind speeds. For hurricanes greater than Category-1, for Feeders 02a, 06a,
08b, and 10b 80% to 90% of customers are expected to lose power, even when VIWAPA
rebalances load to minimize shedding. Customers served by Feeders 02a and 09b are less
vulnerable to a Category-2 hurricane, and have an expected load shed ratio of 65% to 75%
on average. The most robust Feeder is 01a, with an expected load shed ratio of 5% in a
Category-2 hurricane. Still, this robustness is only evident for these minor hurricanes, as
all feeders, including Feeder 01a, have an expected load shed of ≥ 95% in a Category-3
storm.
Hurricane mitigation via composite poles and burying power lines underground can have a
significant impact on the survivability of the STX EPDS and people’s quality of life during
a disaster. Both composite poles and underground power lines will reduce load shed for all
feeder lines on STX. In fact, an optimal, combined approach using both composite poles
and undergrounding achieves remarkably low expected load shed on average. On the other
hand, implementing this combined approach is costly and complicated. Instead, depending
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on the feeder line, it may be more efficient to choose either installing composite poles or
burying lines as a way to reduce load shed.
Decisions makers must consider several technical factors before choosing one method
over another. Composite poles protect attached transformers, but the lines attached to the
poles are still vulnerable to tree strikes. In contrast, underground lines are unaffected by tree
strikes, but are vulnerable to flooding and storm surge and many EPDS elements connecting
customers to feeders will remain vulnerable to high wind speeds. Thus, composite poles
are generally more effective in areas where there is a lower chance of debris strikes, such
as an urban or suburban area, and underground power lines are more effective in areas with
lots of debris or far from the coastline, such as in higher elevation areas or forests.
We see this trade-off in the EPDS on STX with the expected benefits of hardening Feeders
01a and 06a for Category-3 hurricanes. Feeder 01a with composite poles has an expected
load shed ratio of 50%, which is significantly lower than undergrounding Feeder 01a (65%).
In contrast, Feeder 06a with composite poles maintains an expected load shed of nearly
100% due to its location in a forested area with high chance of tree strikes. Undergrounding
06a instead decreases expected load shed to less than 75%.
5.2 Vulnerability and Hardening of the United States Vir-
gin Islands Water Distribution System to Hurricanes
5.2.1 Hardening the STX WDS without Consideration of the STX
EDPS
There are several current initiatives to harden the water system irrespective of the results
presented in this thesis. Many hardening options focus on operational improvements like
developing a new distribution master plan, a water rationing plan in case of emergency, and
a 72-hour pre-landfall playbook for pre-storm preparations to protect components (USVI
Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). Physical hardening focuses on
managing leaks and old pipes. One of the current major tasks for VIWAPA is to replace
old pipes with new, more stable ones. Furthermore, all the other components like pump
stations and storage tanks are being updated and rehabilitated as well. That means installing
a better foundation for tanks, constructing pump protection, and installing redundant pumps
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and back-up generators. One important initiative is improving the water infrastructure in
the western part of STX to make the system more independent of pressure from Kingshill
tank. One potential plan is to install a main transmission line from Richmond pump station
to Frederiksted.
Importantly, new recommendations can be made for hardening the STX WDS based on
results presented in this thesis. For example, results in this thesis show how long different
parts of the STX WDS have access to water when losing pump stations. This information
can support emergency planning in preparation for a hurricane. Because hurricanes can be
forecast a few days ahead and the system has several days of pressure when completely filled,
it makes sense to fill tanks before a natural disaster. This not only reduces damages, but
provides upwards of six days of water to Christiansted and 13 days of water to Frederiksted.
Another important consideration is to equip the pump stations with backup generators. This
helps keep the STX WDS operable. The problem with generators might be that they are
dependent on other parts of the critical infrastructure like the supply chain and transportation
system to access fuel (Good 2019). Nevertheless, this research shows Contentment and
Richmond pump stations are more important than Concordia for maintaining pressure
within the STX WDS. To simplify the complicated supply chain issues, backup generators
can focus on these pump stations.
5.2.2 Hardening the STXWDSwithConsideration of STXEPDSHur-
ricane Vulnerability
The combination of EPDS andWDS analysis tells a complicated story. Concordia pumping
station is far more vulnerable to blackouts than Contentment pumping station. Loss of
Concordia pumping station on its own, however, will likely not lead to major water outages
as Kingshill tank will still receive enough pressure to be filled and serve downstream
communities (Figure 4.4).
Decision makers should consider the power line feeder designs and optimal hardening to
determine how to support the STX WDS. Concordia is on Feeder 06b and Contentment on
Feeder 02a, and optimal hardening for the feeders requires different approaches and costs.
Feeder 06b, for instance, is in a vegetated region with high likelihood of debris strikes.
Thus, Concordia pumping station would benefit more from underground power lines than
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from composite poles (Figure 4.2).
In contrast, Feeder 02a is close to Richmond substation and in an urban area. Results
from Section 4.1.2 show that neither undergrounding the main feeder lines nor installing
composite poles is sufficient on its own. This means Contentment pump station is best
served by an optimal mix of underground lines and composite poles.
A potentially cost-efficient solution to minimize the vulnerability of the WDS is to harden
only the portion of both feeders required to reach Contentment and Concordia. Recom-
mended hardening methods for these portions of each power line would be underground
installation for Feeder 06b and composite poles for Feeder 02a.
Moreover, there are additional options for hardening WDS to blackouts. As shown in
Figure 3.14, there are nearby feeders besides 06b and 02a which could be connected to
the pump stations. These connections would neither require undergrounding lines nor
installing composite poles and would simply build redundancy. Specifically, Concordia can
be connected to Feeder 06a and Contentment can be connected to Feeder 01a. Since Feeder
01a is the most robust Feeder across the entire island, connecting Contentment to Feeder
01a may be a cost effective, fast, and robust strategy.
5.3 Future Work
Despite the contributions of this thesis, there is still considerable work that should be done.
Future work for the St. Croix Electric Power System: Follow-on work for improving the
STX EPDS would be to improve the operator model. One approach would be extending the
operator model to include the minimization of hardening costs in the objective. Another
option would be including landscape analysis to produce more nuanced models of hurricane
wind speed impacts. A final consideration would be including weights for critical loads to
ensure load shed does not affect critical facilities like hospitals and police stations.
Future work for the St. Croix Water Distribution System: While this thesis presents
initial results for the STXWDS system, the operator model needs to be improved to include
more realistic pressures and inline equipment (e.g., pressure reducing values). Follow-on
work would be to improve the WNTR water model and calibrate it to fit historical data
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for VIWAPA. This is especially important with respect to customer demand. Moreover,
additional analysis could be completed to test different STX WDS hardening methods.
Future reductions in leaks, as well as the installation of new pipes, backup generators, new
pump stations, and new tanks should be considered using the STXWDS model to simulate
impacts on customer demand.
Future work for USVI Water-Power System interdependencies: There are several ways
to improve our understanding of interdependent EPDSs and WDSs in the USVI. First
would be creating an equivalent analysis of the STT/STJ water-power systems to compare
vulnerabilities and hardening recommendations. Moreover, the current models and analysis
only consider snapshots of power flow impacts with water simulations. There may be
benefits to developing new operator models that can be integrated more directly, e.g., using
a power flow simulation with the current pressure-driven demand water simulation, or using
a water optimization model with the current alternating current power flow model.
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APPENDIX A:
Hurricane Storm Surge on St. Croix
Maps showing areas on STX affected by storm surge per hurricane category.
Adapted from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2019).
Figure A.1. Map of storm surge areas (Category 1-3).
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Maps showing areas on STX affected by storm surge per hurricane category.
Adapted from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2019).
Figure A.2. Map of storm surge areas (Category 4-5).
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APPENDIX B:
Parameters for Models and Simulations
B.1 Monte Carlo Simulation
Table B.1. Stress Parameter Monte Carlo simulation
Variable Mean poles SD poles Mean wires SD wires
Gust response G 0.948 0.104 0.801 0.088
Force coefficient C f 0.900 0.108 1.000 0.120
Exposure coefficient Kz 0.951 0.057 1.024 0.061
Area normal to wind A 28.600 1.716 54.000 3.240
height h 17.650 0.530 36.500 1.095
Parameters used to compute the stress caused by wind speeds on poles and wires.
Adapted from Salman (2016) and Salman (2019).
Table B.2. Strength Parameter Monte Carlo Simulation
Strength R0 [psf] factor a1 factor a2 factor b1 factor b2 age t [years]
Wood 1,152,000 0.01442 0.10683 0.00013 1.84600 2
Composite 5,000,000 0.01442 0.10683 0.00013 1.84600 0
Parameters used to compute the strength of the wood and composite utility poles.
Adapted from Creative Pultrusions (2013), Salman (2016), and Salman (2019).
B.2 Electric Power Distribution Model
Table B.3. Parameter for Power Distribution Model
Parameter λpi,k λqi,k βi j Vmini V
max
i
Value 1 1 0.15 for transformer1.0 for all other 0.2 1.8
Parameters and factors used in the ACOPF model simulation.
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B.3 Water Distribution Model
Table B.4. Parameter for Water Distribution Model
Parameter Roughness
Value 120
Parameters and factors used in the WNTR model simulation.
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